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ABSTRACT 
 
Ming Hu 
 
Termination of NGO Alliances in China: Typology and Determinants 
 
In 2008, grassroots NGOs formed 13 alliances in response to the need for 
emergency relief and post-disaster recovery after the Sichuan Earthquake that occurred in 
West China and killed approximately 87,000 people. These alliances served to raise and 
deliver relief materials, train and supervise volunteers, promote information sharing, and 
assist victims with mental health and livelihood recovery. However, all alliances were 
terminated within less than four years. Although plenty of scholarship discusses how 
corporate alliances evolve or fail, few studies focus on interorganizational collaboration 
among nonprofits. To explore how NGOs developed collective actions in China’s adverse 
sociopolitical environment, the author performed three years of observation in four 
coalitions and interviewed 60 alliance leaders, employees, and volunteers. This paper 
identifies four types of termination these NGO alliances experienced: three of them failed 
at their very births, five self-disbanded shortly after the end of emergency aid, three 
dissolved due to failed institutionalization, and the remaining two evolved into 
independent organizations. Tracking their life cycles, this study finds four main factors 
accountable for their terminations: political pressure, funding shortage, short-term 
orientation, and leadership failure. In particular, the repressive NGO regulation regime 
and limited funding sources fundamentally restricted all alliances’ capacity and 
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sustainability. Further, the transient nature of disaster relief efforts and the conflict 
between disaster management and planned work areas contributed to the short-term 
orientation among alliance members and, thus, led to the closure of some alliances 
shortly after they provided emergency relief. In addition, though generally exempt from 
internal rivalry that often undermines inter-firm partnerships, NGO alliances of all types 
were confronted with leadership challenges—partner misfits concerning resources, 
strategy, and mission; flawed governing structures, and undesired individual leadership. 
The four factors interplayed and led to alliance dissolution through different 
combinations. The paper points out that, in addition to environmental uncertainty, 
leadership failure has become a major challenge for nonprofit collaborations.   
 
                                                                                      Chao Guo, Ph.D., Chair 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit organization alliances have grown with a striking speed in recent years 
(Brown, et al. 2000; Duwe 2001; Guo & Acar 2005; Retchie 1995). Some alliances are 
dedicated to social service, while others to policy advocacy and public education. With 
the assistance of information technology development and globalization, many alliances 
expand into international issues.  However, there are relatively few studies on this 
phenomenon (Murray 1998). Also, most studies focus on why nonprofit organizations 
build alliances (Arsenault 1998; Blau & Rabrenovic 1991; Brinkerhoff 2002), which 
organizations tend to establish alliances (Foster & Meinhard 2002; Guo & Acar 2005), 
and how to improve alliance management (Yanacopulos 2005; Brinkerhoff 2002). 
Considering the inherent instability in alliances as an interorganizational establishment, 
little is known from current literature about the life cycle of nonprofit alliances, how they 
are terminated, and what determines their termination. Some cross-sectoral studies do 
involve alliance failure in nonprofit-government collaboration (Simo & Bies 2007; Boris 
& Steuerle 2006) and nonprofit-business collaboration (Crane 2000; Austin 2000), but 
findings from such research may not apply to intra-sectoral alliances of nonprofit 
organizations because of the unique nature of the nonprofit sector (Ott & Dicke 2001; 
Salamon & Anheier 1996). Another problem is that the majority of previous literature 
focuses on the analysis of individual organizations rather than alliances and, therefore, 
tends to be blind to the factors and mechanisms at the alliance level that lead to 
partnership dissolution.  
Based on a sample of 13 nongovernmental organization (NGO) alliances engaged 
in disaster relief and post-disaster recovery after the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake (Note: also 
 2 
 
 
called “Wenchuan Earthquake” because the epicenter was located in Wenchuan County, 
Sichuan Province) in West China, this study aims to explore how nonprofit alliances, 
especially in disaster management, are terminated. Such knowledge will increase the 
understanding of the life cycle of nonprofit partnerships and help evaluate the impact of 
interorganizational cooperation in the nonprofit sector. The second purpose is to reveal 
what accounts for alliance termination from the perspective of alliance management. 
Related findings will benefit nonprofit practitioners and policy makers in terms of risk 
management in multiple organizational partnerships.  
As an empirical study of intra-sectoral alliances in the nonprofit sector, this 
explorative research attempts to answer the following questions:  (a) Why do nonprofit 
organizations build alliances in disaster management? (b) How are nonprofit alliances 
terminated? (c) What causes alliance termination? 
Restricted to data availability, in this study I focus on NGOs, a subsector of the 
entire nonprofit sector. NGO has varied definitions in different contexts (Martens 2002). 
But either as voluntary associations, grassroots organizations, people organizations, or 
some others, these definitions share some key elements such as participation, 
empowerment, locality, and community, in addition to making no profit and seeking no 
governmental office (Fisher 1997). In non-democratic regimes or premature democracies, 
distinguishing NGOs from the rest of the nonprofit sector is meaningful. The concept 
“NGO” indicates the pre-democracy disposition and also the grassroots traits independent 
from the state. 
NGOs in modern China arose in the early 1980s and experienced a rapid growth 
after the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women (Wang 2007). In the post-
 3 
 
 
communist context, NGOs acquired an identity distinguishing them from other nonprofit 
organizations: They usually refer to not-for-profit organizations independent from the 
state, nonpolitical, supportive of social justice, pursuing public good, and having 
complete management structures and regular programs. This definition excludes the 
following organizations: (a) nonprofit organizations that are affiliated with or mainly 
supported by the state (sometimes called governmental NGOs or GONGOs); (b) 
nonprofit organizations that are established for group interests such as self-help groups, 
trade associations, industry associations, and associations of professionals; and (c) 
volunteer groups that do not have complete governing bodies or regular projects.  
With respect to research design, the multiple case study method was applied in 
this research. Yin (1994, p.3) points out that “case study allows an investigation to retain 
the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events—such as individual life 
cycles, organizational and managerial processes.” Another merit of case study lies in its 
applicability when “there will be many more variables of interest than data points” (Yin 
2003, p.13). In this study I use the multiple case study method to explore NGO alliance 
termination for two reasons. First, the qualitative research methodology can facilitate an 
in-depth, process-based analysis on the interactions between alliance members and 
between alliances and their environments. This merit helps overcome the limitation of 
scarce information about the subjects in an explorative study (Strauss & Corbin1990). 
Second, the small sample made impractical a quantitative research design requiring a 
relatively large sample. As a new phenomenon, the alliance of NGOs is little recorded for 
research purpose.  
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The research study is presented in four sections. After introducing the research 
background, research purposes, questions, and methodology in the first section, I review 
previous literature on the typology of nonprofit alliances, theories on alliance formation, 
and what causes alliance termination in the second section. The third section begins with 
an introduction of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, the background for alliance formation 
and dissolution in this study. Then I introduce case selection criteria, data collecting 
methods, and confidentiality issues. The fourth section presents the main findings. After a 
brief demonstration of why NGOs developed alliances in response to disaster 
management, four patterns of alliance termination are identified: failure at birth, abrupt 
termination, failed transition, and evolution into independent organizations. Four factors 
(political pressure, resource shortage, short-term orientation, and leadership failure) are 
found accountable for the dissolution of the 13 alliances. In the final section, I discuss the 
contribution of this study and its limitations and provide suggestions for practitioners and 
future researchers based on my findings.    
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Definition and Scope of NGO Alliance  
In the nonprofit world, there is a wide range of interorganizational collaborations 
and the corresponding multi-organizational structures (MOS), including “network,” 
“council,” “conference,” “forum,” “coalition,” “association,” “alliance,” “league,” 
“federation,” and “union.” They vary in terms of timeframe, purpose of partnership, 
communication pattern, membership structure and openness, structural formality, 
collaboration scope, and managerial centrality (Irandoust & Benaskeur 2008; Provan 
1983; Selsky 1998; Yanacopulos 2005). Among the more popular MOSs is alliance, “a 
strategic restructuring that includes a commitment to continue for the foreseeable future, 
shared or transferred decision-making power, and some type of formal agreement” 
(Kohm, Piana, & Gowdy 2000, p.1). Alliances are widely used in nonprofits as a flexible 
interorganizational arrangement between a network, in which participating organizations 
are fully autonomous and not committed at all to others, and a union, in which members 
are fully integrated into one new organization. As a consequence, in nonprofit literature 
“alliance” is often interchangeable with other interorganizational configurations such as 
“goal-directed network” (Kilduff & Tsai 2003), “coalition” (Yanacopulos 2005), and 
“coalitional federation” (Selsky 1998).  
Kohm, Pinana, and Gowdy (2000) point out that from the primary focus 
perspective, there are two types of nonprofit alliances: administrative consolidation and 
joint programming. Administrative consolidation includes the sharing, exchanging, or 
contracting of administrative functions to increase administrative efficiency, while joint 
programming involves collectively launching and managing programs to improve the 
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programmatic mission of the participating organizations. With respect to the timeframe, 
they include task-oriented and process-oriented alliances (McLaughlin 2010). A task-
oriented alliance is created to accomplish a single defined job or series of jobs, and a 
process-oriented one is formed to have an impact on an ongoing area of management. As 
a result, “in the former, there is little expectation that the alliance’s life will extend the 
task at hand. In the process alliance, there is every reason to expect that it will continue as 
long as it is useful to all parties” (McLaughlin 2010, p.94). Murray (1998) identifies five 
basic types of nonprofit collaboration based on the integration level, including (a) 
information sharing or coordination of service; (b) joint efforts at community planning, 
advocacy, public education, or fundraising; (c) joint delivery of programs using “new” 
money (for instance, government grant); (d) rationalization of existing services; and (e) 
full partnerships and mergers. Other studies explore the functions of alliances in 
accountability (Sloan 2008), legitimacy and autonomy (Carino 2002), organizational 
learning (Brown 1991), staff development, and so on.  
Researchers have several theories to explain the formation of nonprofit alliances, 
among which are resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), transaction cost 
theory (Dickson & Weaver 1997; Wood & Gray 1991; Williamson1991), institutionalism 
(Dacin & Oliver 2007; Meyer & Rowan 1977), and network (Gulati 1998; Larson 1992). 
Most studies on nonprofit collaboration take a resource dependence perspective (Provan 
1984; Zinn et al. 1997; Zuckerman & D’Aunno 1990) in which nonprofit organizations 
develop partnerships to acquire critical resources and reduce environmental uncertainty. 
In contrast, theorists of transaction cost argue that interorganizational collaborations are 
created to reduce transaction costs and maximize economic or psychological benefits. 
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Efficiency therefore serves as the main driving force for alliance formation. Moreover, 
the institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Meyer & Scott 1992) claims that 
organizations demonstrate conformity to the norms and social expectations in its 
environment. Developing partnerships with other organizations can help them meet 
external requirement and improve organizational legitimacy (Dacin & Oliver 2007). 
Finally, according to the network theory, nonprofit organizations establish collective 
relationships based on the networks in which they are embedded and shared with 
awareness, trust, and commitment.  
In addition to these theoretic efforts, other researchers empirically explore why 
and how nonprofits create alliances. Kohm, Piana, and Gowdy (2000) find that the 
motives for building alliances or mergers include increasing efficiency/efficacy, 
improving fundraising competitiveness, and reducing overhead expenses. Foster and 
Meinhard (2002) argue that organizational characteristics (including size, age, mandate, 
the share of female employees, and organizational structure), environmental pressures 
(including the increased demand to provide services and be accountable, the need to 
address inefficiencies and participate in for-profit activities, and an increased sense of 
vulnerability), and organizational attitudes toward cooperation account for the formation 
of MOSs. Guo and Acar (2005) find that organizations that have older ages, greater 
resource sufficiency, lower diversity of government funding sources, or more board 
linkages  are more likely to develop formal types of collaborative activities. In addition, 
nonprofits in social services, education, and research are less likely to develop formal 
collaborations with other organizations.  
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Alliance Termination  
Nonprofit organizations establish a variety of collaborations in health care, youth 
development, education, disaster management, community development, and democracy 
promotion, among others. These partnerships are not merely restricted within the 
nonprofit sector—inter-sectoral collaboration has become increasingly popular. 
Nonprofits built close relationships with government agencies in public good delivery 
(Brinkerhoff 2002; Gazley 2007). Additionally, partnerships between nonprofits and 
corporations have also multiplied. They take various forms and often operate under the 
banner of “strategic collaboration” (Austin 2000) or “social alliance” (Berger 2004). 
Moreover, many great concerns brought about by globalization have expanded the 
influence of nonprofit organizations to international areas; numerous international 
alliances have been created in response to climate change, fair trade, labor and immigrant 
rights, human trafficking, climate change, and corporate social responsibility (Richie 
1995).    
While nonprofit alliances multiply with a striking speed, they are terminated 
almost as quickly. Though little literature involves a systematic scan of the termination of 
nonprofit partnerships, a few studies indicate high instability (Aiken et al. 1975; Singer & 
Yankey 1991; Snavely & Tracy 2000). Similarly, some business studies find that the 
failure rate of strategic alliances among enterprises is as high as 40-60% (Park & Ungson 
2001).
1
  
Some authors claim that interorganizational collaboration is instable by nature. 
According to Williamson (1991), strategic alliances are inherently temporal, unstable, 
                                                            
1 However, termination does not necessarily mean failure, though alliance failure indicates some type of 
termination (Lunnan 2007; Sadowski 2008). 
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and disfavored, as changes in an alliance cannot be made unilaterally (as with market 
consent) or by power (as with hierarchy). However, such an argument works only in a 
broad sense but fails to explain why some partnerships exist longer than others or why 
partnerships have different outcomes. On the other hand, while most studies focus on the 
formation and management of interagency partnerships, few involve their termination, 
even in the business sector where alliance research is comparatively rich (Cui, Calontone, 
& Griffith 2011; Sadowski 2008). Though some theories of coalition formation focusing 
on the initial conditions for creating collaborations (for instance, resource 
interdependence, opportunity of reducing transaction cost) may shed light on reasons for 
termination (Cui, Calantone, & Griffith 2011; Das & Teng 1996), the validity of such 
theories is limited. The reasons are simple: (a) those theories provide only a partial 
explanation of the formation of interorganizational partnership (Guo & Acar 2005); and 
(b) formation conditions are not necessarily the same as maintenance conditions because 
the latter involve the complicated process of organization management and the 
interaction between alliances and their environments during alliance operation.  
Some scholars attempt to explain the termination of alliances from the point of 
view of organization science. Alter and Hage (1993) argue that networks fall into 
imbalance when the coordination and integration among participating organizations does 
not keep pace with structural development, which is defined by different levels of 
differentiation and complexity within the system. The imbalance then results in the 
failure of evolution. On the other hand, the game theory (Olson 1965) and agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976; Wood 1989) are widely applied to analyze internal conflict 
and disengagement within alliances. Some studies try to combine literature of both lines 
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(for example, Parkhe & Ungson 2001), but the integrated approach faces the same 
dilemma as many other all-purpose efforts: the different properties of each sector (politics, 
business, and nonprofit) require specific perspectives and models for the ad hoc 
understanding of its behaviors. Considering the very limited literature on the termination 
of nonprofit alliances, it is necessary to draw on alliance research in other areas. On the 
other hand, all types of MOSs share some common characteristics from the organization 
science perspective.  
Termination of Political Alliances  
The studies of political alliance dissolution mainly focus on parliamentary 
elections (King et al. 1990; Laver & Schofiled 1998; Strom & Swindle 2002), coalition 
government (Browne, Frendreis, & Gleiber 1986; Keith & Gibbs 1978; Narud 1995), and 
cross-national alliance (Bennett 1997; Goertz & Diehl 1995; Leeds & Savun 2007). 
Structural attributes of the alliance or the greater regime in which coalition politics is 
played out, the impact of exogenous critical events, and strategic interaction between and 
within parties are often claimed to account for the dissolution of political alliances (Lupia 
& Strom1995). Also, political leaders play the key role in determining collaboration 
outcomes: “Decisions to terminate coalitions or call new elections result from party 
leaders’ rational responses to the constraints of legislative and electoral institutions and 
the anticipated feelings of the electorate” (Lupia & Strom 1995, p.648). These findings 
are echoed by Wright and Golderberg (1985) who claim that coalition members are 
vulnerable to the leader’s persuasion and manipulation because they are uncertain about 
their ultimate payoffs. Narud (1995) argues that the termination of coalition governments 
is conditioned by the cleavage structure and the ideological diversity of the party system 
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and partially determined by the parties’ position in the policy space. With respect to 
international collaborations, Bennett (1997) examines 207 alliances from 1816 to 1984 
and contends that security-autonomy tradeoffs and domestic politics modes affect 
alliance duration.  Leeds and Savun (2007) find that bonding international agreements are 
likely to be opportunistically abrogated when members experience changes that affect the 
value of alliance, but factors influencing the cost of violating bonding terms can reduce 
the probability of breaking commitment.  
Generally, the political alliance theories stress the impact of the environmental 
uncertainty (such as the complexity of the political system, exogenous critical events, and 
uncertain tradeoffs) and the role of coalition leaders upon collaboration outcomes. These 
properties may be shared by nonprofit alliances, since nonprofits are also characterized 
by environmental uncertainties and complex connections (Blau & Rabrenovic 1991).  But 
on the other hand, the different goals of collaboration distinguish political and nonprofit 
organizations and thus their partnerships; political organizations rally around political 
power and country interests while nonprofit organizations rally around public good.  
Termination of Enterprise Alliances 
Partially because of the prominent application of interorganizational collaboration 
in businesses, interfirm alliances (usually called “strategic alliances”) have become a 
hotspot in business research since the 1980s. Researchers performed numerous studies on 
the failure or instability of strategic alliances, equity-based and contract-based, business-
oriented and learning-oriented, horizontal and vertical, among which the relatively 
comprehensive frameworks are developed by Das and Teng (1999), Park and Ungson 
(2001), and Serapio and Cascio (1996).  
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Daz and Teng (1999) create a management process framework to explain risk 
management in strategic alliances. Two types of risks threatening interfirm collaboration 
are identified as relational risk and performance risk. Relational risk is defined as the 
probability and consequence that partner firms of an alliance do not cooperate in a 
desired manner, and performance risk refers to those factors that may jeopardize the 
success of an alliance, even when the partners cooperate fully. Relational risk is regarded 
as critical in determining alliance instability because “alliance partners are primarily 
motivated in enhancing their self-interest at the cost of the partner firms and even the 
alliance” (Daz & Teng 1999, p.51). However, collaboration is threatened by relational 
risk in each phase of alliance management: selecting alliance partners, structuring the 
alliance, operating the alliance, and evaluating the alliance. As a result, the stability of 
strategic alliance depends on three balances—the balance between flexibility and rigidity 
concerning collaboration structure, between competition and cooperation among partners, 
and between short-term and long-term collaborative objectives.  
Another important model of alliance termination was established by Park and 
Ungson (2001). They synthesize previous literature on alliance failure into an alliance 
governance model and argue that failures are caused by two sources of problems: (a) 
opportunistic hazards due to rivalry between partners and (b) coordination and agency 
costs resulting from complexity and uncertainty in managing a cooperative relationship. 
As shown in several theoretical perspectives, including the transaction-cost theory, game 
theory, resource-based view, learning theory, and resource dependence theory, 
opportunistic hazards are inherent in strategic alliances because of the competitive rivalry 
between participant firms. As a result, alliances become a costly governance structure to 
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arrange interfirm transactions as partners try to employ safeguards against potential 
hazards. On the other hand, “strategic alliances also fail because they require excessive 
effort to coordinate and integrate two independent organizations which result in a high 
level of managerial complexity and uncertainty” (Park & Ungson 2001, p.44). 
Specialization and agency problems among alliance managers are two major sources of 
such complexity and uncertainty. Furthermore, two authors develop a dynamics model to 
explain the erosion/failure of strategic alliances, which analyzes ex ante conditions, in 
situ conditions, and ex post conditions in the collaboration management process that 
determines alliance success or failure.  
Serapio and Cascio (1996, p.64) point out other causes of alliance termination, 
excluding alliance failure: (1) differences between partners (for example, incompatibility 
between people, different management styles, or disagreement over objectives); (2) 
breach of agreement; (3) the alliance no longer fits the goals/strategies of a partner; (4) a 
partner needs to exit the alliance because of financial difficulties or to take advantage of 
financial opportunities; and (5) the alliance has met its goals. 
In general, business researchers have developed comprehensive theoretical 
systems and empirical models to explain the instability/failure of interfirm alliances. 
However, attempts to apply these findings to nonprofit alliances may face three 
challenges. First, strategic alliances in business studies are usually operationalized as a 
cooperative relationship between two firms (Lerner, Shane, &Tsai 2003), which 
significantly differs from MOSs in terms of managerial complexity, tradeoffs, and 
collaboration dynamics.
2
  Second, business researchers put more emphasis upon the 
                                                            
2 Axelrod (1986) and Oye (1986) identify the number of partners as one important factor influencing 
alliance stability.  
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influence of internal governance than upon the external environment. Like their political 
counterparts, however, nonprofit alliances are often faced with a great deal of 
environmental uncertainty. Third, business alliances are built to improve partners’ 
competitiveness and also are fundamentally influenced by internal rivalry among partners. 
Firms are even warned not to be “good partners,” so as to avoid being exploited by other 
opportunistic partners (Larsson et al. 1998). However, restricted by the non-distribution 
restriction and driven by the purpose of public good, nonprofit organizations may have 
different dynamics in their partnerships. This requires cautious and special examinations 
of nonprofit alliances.  
Termination of Nonprofit Alliances 
Scholars have not examined alliance failure or dissolution in the nonprofit sector 
until recently. Relevant literature is still scarce compared to that in business and politics 
research.  
Murray (1998) identifies four sets of factors that influence the formation, 
performance, and duration of nonprofit alliances, including: (a) the type of collaboration, 
such as information sharing, joint efforts, joint delivery, rationalization of existing 
services, or merger; (b) characteristics of the parties; (c) the process of developing and 
implementing the collaborative activities; and (d) environmental or contextual factors, 
such as informal networks, third party influence, resource scarcity, and general 
community and social values. 
Brinkerhoff (2002) points out that mutuality and organization identity together 
shape nonprofit partnership. Mutuality carries the spirit of partnership principles, while 
organization identity defines the rationale for selecting particular partners. When one 
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partner follows the more dominant partner and loses its own organizational identity, it 
will become an extension of the dominant partner or be incorporated into it; at this point 
the partnership comes to an end.  
With respect to empirical studies, Berger (2004) identifies six problems that 
undermine nonprofit-company collaborations, including misunderstandings between 
partners, misallocation of costs and benefits, mismatches of power, mismatched partners, 
misfortunes of time, and mistrust. These problems are caused by two groups of factors: 
challenges in the nonprofit-profit fit and the structural characteristics existing in the 
partners and the alliance itself.  Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) find out some practical 
factors that account for alliance dissolution in their study of three-sectoral partnerships 
for community regeneration, which involves business, community, and nonprofit 
organizations. The reasons include the absence of a dedicated budget to maintain the 
collaborative program, the fulfillment of partnership goals, the involvement burden upon 
local organizations and key individuals, and the sense of “network fatigue” (Lowndes & 
Skelcher 1998, p.329) among partners. 
Other studies involve intra-sectoral collaborations among nonprofits. 
Staggenberg’s early research (1986) emphasizes the influence of the environment and 
ideological conflicts in social movement coalitions. He argues that “once exceptional 
environmental conditions subside, ideological conflicts and the organizational 
maintenance needs of individual movement organizations are likely to cause conflicts 
within coalitions which may lead to their dissolution” (Staggenber 1996, p.388). In 
contrast, Dutting and Sugge (2010) place the emphasis upon the impact of inner conflicts 
among parties. Four factors are claimed to put collaboration at risk, including (a) 
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irreconcilable differences in organizations’ ideologies and objectives; (b) irreconcilable 
differences in leadership styles that lead to transparency problems and insufficient mutual 
respect and trust; (c) competition among parties for donor funding and withdrawal of 
donor funding for collaborative activities; and (d) the fear of being submerged with others 
that results in the loss of visibility and means to claim accomplishments as their own.  
Compared to politics and business literature, the impact of both environmental 
conditions and inner conflicts are emphasized significantly more in nonprofit alliance 
studies. But while focusing on challenges in collaboration formation and operation, most 
nonprofit studies do not explore the specific mechanisms of alliance termination. 
Moreover, considering the significant difference between intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral 
collaboration (Guo & Acar 2005; Milne, Lyer, & Gooding-Williams 1996), the 
dissolution of alliances within the nonprofit sector requires more in-depth exploration in 
terms of termination conditions, mechanisms, approaches, and impact.  
By examining the evolution and termination of the 13 NGO alliances that were 
established in response to the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake relief in China, this article aims 
to: (a) make an explorative study about how intra-sectoral alliances of NGOs are 
terminated from the alliance perspective; (b) examine the impact of environmental 
conditions and intra-alliance tensions upon alliance termination; (d) identify other factors 
causing partnership dissolution and examine the interplay of different determinants; and 
(d) develop an empirical framework for analysis of alliance termination for future 
research. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Sichuan Earthquake Relief 
On May 12
th
, 2008, an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 struck attacked West China. 
With the epicenter in Yingxiu, Sichuan, the disaster caused more than 69,000 deaths and 
17,000 lost people (The China National Commission for Disaster Reduction & the United 
Nations Development Plan 2009). The economic loss was estimated as high as ￥8.45 
trillion ($1.24 trillion by the ratio of 6.8: 1 in 2008). While more than 95% of the death 
toll and economic loss occurred in Sichuan, three neighboring provinces (Gansu, Shanxi, 
and Chongqing) also suffered significantly. The central government established the 
Disaster Relief Headquarters, directed by Premier Wen Jiabao, and sent more than 
157,000 soldiers to assist in disaster relief. Four months later, the three-year Sichuan 
Earthquake reconstruction master plan worth￥10 trillion was launched (the State 
Council 2008). In early 2012, the central government declared the rebuilding plan was 
finished.
3
  
The voluntary sector’s engagement in disaster relief was unprecedented in many 
dimensions. As a result, some scholars regarded 2008 as “the first year of China’s civil 
society” (for example, Gao & Yuan 2008). More than 3 million volunteers participated in 
the frontline relief efforts.
4
  The total donation for emergency relief and post-disaster 
reconstruction was ￥76.7 billion, as much as 3.44 times than the total Chinese giving in 
                                                            
3 The state Council News Office declared on Feb 24th 2012 that the Sichuan Earthquake post-disaster 
reconstruction plan has been completed. See http://www.china.com.cn/zhibo/2012-
02/24/content_24698719.htm 
4 The State Council News Office released the white book “Disaster Reduction in China” in May 2012, 
which described volunteerism for the Sichuan Earthquake relief. See http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-
05/11/content_1310227.htm 
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2007.
5
 The disaster relief also featured NGOs involvement—more than 300 NGOs 
entered the earthquake-stricken areas and provided relief services (Zhu & Chan 2009). 
Their behaviors were regarded as “the first exposition of the Chinese NGO sector” by an 
NGO leader.   
Most NGOs built various types of interorganizational partnerships in response to 
the disaster relief. Large NGOs (usually with an international background) mainly chose 
to partner with local governments, though a very few of them also supported grassroots 
organizations’ relief actions. Foundations partnered with media in terms of fundraising 
and disaster preparedness education and with local governments in collecting and 
delivering relief materials. Government-affiliated NGOs were in charge of private and 
corporate donations and registered and deployed volunteers. Other NGOs mainly 
collaborated with each other to develop joint relief programs. In addition, numerous 
volunteer groups were temporarily established in the frontline areas and in Internet-based 
virtual communities to deliver organized relief services. Owing to the striking outcomes 
of these collaborative efforts, some NGO researchers optimistically claimed that China 
has entered a new era of NGO partnership (for example, Zhu & Chan 2009). In fact, few 
NGO alliances, especially intra-sectoral alliances, were founded in the Chinese nonprofit 
sector before the Sichuan Earthquake. However, it turned out that almost all nonprofit 
partnerships that were founded for the Sichuan Earthquake relief came to an end within 
four years after the disaster, though the comprehensive community recovery is far from 
                                                            
5 See the Ministry of Civil Affairs (May 12 2009), Wenchuan Earthquake Donations (No. 140). See  
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2008-12/06/content_16907948.htm 
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being finished.
6
 The termination of these partnerships provides an opportunity to 
empirically examine what accounts for alliance dissolution in the nonprofit sector. 
Case Selection  
The criteria used to select cases in this study are as follows. (a) The alliance was 
composed of two and more NGOs. In other words, it was an interagency arrangement of 
formal organizations. (b) NGOs were the majority of the alliance, accounting for more 
than half the members. (c) Members had fully shared and publicly declared goals 
regarding earthquake relief or post-disaster recovery. (d) The alliance had a clear (rather 
than tacit) organizational structure. (e) The alliance took some type of joint actions in 
respond to the disaster.  
The following partnerships are excluded from the sample: (a) networks that did 
not have shared goals among parties and that did not have a clear organizational structure; 
(b) dead-lettered partnerships that took no joint actions regarding disaster relief or 
recovery; (c) cross-sectoral collaborations between NGOs and corporations or between 
NGOs and government agencies (including the government-affiliated NGOs); (d) 
contract-based projects between NGOs and foundations or corporations; (e) government-
controlled federations, even if the majority of the members were NGOs;  and (f) 
associations of individuals.    
The research plan aims to include all NGO alliances that meet the selection 
criteria. The initial alliance list had several sources. The first source was my personal 
                                                            
6 Despite the government declaring the fulfillment of the post-disaster reconstruction in the sense of facility 
and infrastructure rebuilding, community recovery may require 10 or more years for disasters as huge as 
the Sichuan Earthquake. For example, Chang (2010) examines the Kobe Earthquake recovery and finds 
that the local economy experienced a three to four year temporary boost and then stabilized. Also, Kobe 
regained the same population 10 years after the disaster. Comerio (2004) found that more than half of the 
recovery projects in San Francisco and Santa Cruz were still under construction 15 years after the 1989 
Loma Prieta Earthquake. 
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network in the NGO sector. Having worked for two well-networked NGOs in China’s 
three NGO hotspots as a program manager, I was engaged in a well-informed community 
of nonprofit professionals. The information of most alliances would be exchanged in my 
community. Second, I read through all related issues of Disaster Relief Observer for 
Social Organizations, an electronic magazine published by a nonprofit media 
organization. During the Sichuan Earthquake, the magazine was the most comprehensive 
source about NGO relief efforts. Third, I searched the Internet by using all alliance-
related key words, including “lianmeng (alliance),” “zhongxin (conference or network),” 
“wangluo (network),”  “lianhe xingdong (joint action)” “lianhehui (conference),” and 
“pingtai (platform or conference)” to check for any other alliances missing from my list. 
Last, I asked NGO network leaders to double-check the list to examine redundancy and 
missing data.  
The final list entails 13 NGO alliances as shown in Table 1. It demonstrates that 
as the major affected region, Sichuan, hosted four NGO relief alliances. Alliances also 
appeared in most neighboring provinces, such as Gansu, Shanxi, Guizhou, and Congqing, 
and in some NGO hotspot cities, like Kunming, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Xiamen. The 
number of participating organizations varied from 4 to 28. Their focus areas included 
collecting and disseminating disaster information, assessing victims’ needs, raising 
money and relief materials, recruiting and training volunteers, providing settlement 
services, taking care of children and the elderly, and enhancing public awareness on 
disaster preparedness. These alliances achieved a great deal even only from the point of 
view of relief materials and funding.    
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Figure 1  Location of the 13 NGO Alliances for the Sichuan Earthquake Relief 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 1  Basic information of 13 NGO Alliances after the Sichuan Earthquake 
Alliance Abbr. Location Formation Closure No. of 
Members 
Focus Areas Main Outcomes 
Sichuan United Office 
for NGO Disaster 
Relief  
SUO Chengdu May 2008 June 2008 24 Raising and delivering relief 
materials; information 
collection and dissemination 
Raised relief materials of 
￥10 million; conducted 12 
disaster investigations 
Sichuan 5/12 Center 
for Voluntary Disaster 
Relief  
CVDR Chengdu May 2008 March 2012 28 Information sharing; strategy 
coordination; volunteer 
training; capacity building 
Raised relief materials of ￥2 
million, supervised 133 
volunteers, received more 
than 240 organization visitors 
Zundao Volunteer 
Center 
ZVC Zundao 
Town, 
Sichuan 
May 2008 June 2009 20 Raising and delivering relief 
materials; volunteer 
recruiting supervision; child 
education; community-based 
victim service 
Raised relief materials of 
￥10 million, supervised 400 
volunteers, established 10 
community culture centers 
New Hometown Plan NHP Chengdu June 2008 March 2012 4 Integrated community 
recovery service 
Established an integrated 
community center, developed 
three victim self-help 
organizations, hosted 30 
long-term volunteers 
Kunming NGO United 
Relief 
KUR Kunming May 2008 May 2008 6 Raising relief materials Raised relief materials of 
￥70,000  
Xiamen Emergency 
Relief Group  
XERG Xiamen May 2008 May 2008 7 Raising relief materials Raised relief materials of 
￥567,000 
Shanxi Voluntary 
United Relief  
SVUR Xi’an May 2008 June 2008 13 Community-based victim 
service;  raising relief 
materials 
Raised relief materials of 
￥700,000 and supervised 
about 40 volunteers 
Shanghai New Hump 
Project 
SNHP Shanghai May 2008 May 2008 5 Raising relief materials Raised relief materials of ￥2 
million 
 
 
 
2
2
 
  
 
 
 
(Continued) 
Alliance Abbr. Location Formation Closure No. of 
Members 
Focus Areas Main Outcomes 
Guangdong Care for 
Sichuan Migrant 
People 
GCSMP Guangdong May 2008 May 2008 15 Mental health assistance for 
victims 
Almost nothing  
Gansu United Relief 
Group  
GURG Lanzhou May 2008 June 2008 7 Disaster information 
collection raising relief 
materials 
Raised relief materials of 
about￥50,000, investigated 
one township, and trained 
about 20 volunteers 
Chongqing Voluntary 
Relief Center for the 
5/12 Earthquake 
CVRC Chongqing May 2008 May 2008 8 Disaster information 
collection; raising relief 
materials 
Raised relief materials of 
￥20,000 or so 
Chongqing Volunteer 
Union for Disaster 
Relief 
CVFDR Chongqing May 2008 July 2008 9 Raising relief materials; 
recruiting and supervising 
volunteers 
Raised relief materials of 
￥700,000 or so and recruited 
130 volunteers 
Guizhou Voluntary 
Disaster Relief 
Network  
GVDR
N 
Guiyang May 2008 February 
2009 
18 Raising relief materials; 
volunteer recruiting and 
supervision; community-
based victim service 
Raised relief materials of 
￥500,000 or so and recruited 
60 volunteers 
 
  
 
 
2
3
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Data Collection 
After identifying relief alliances, I use three methods to collect data: observation, 
semi-structured interview, and document study.  
Observation “examines the intricacies of interactions and relationships of 
individuals” (Lunenburg & Lrby 2008, pp.92-93). With respect to the complicated 
sociopolitical environment for Chinese NGOs, observation can help researchers acquire 
an in-depth understanding of organizational behaviors in NGOs and of the interactions 
and relationships between NGOs, governments, and the public. Two types of observation 
were applied in this study: participant observation and nonparticipant observation. 
According to Swanwick (1994), in participant observation the researcher adopts an 
integrated full-time role with research participants (usually for a long time) to observe 
their behavior in a natural setting. Often used in qualitative research, this method enables 
the researcher to acquire knowledge-in-action from the perspective of insiders (Chatman 
1992). In contrast, non-participant observation is a relatively unobtrusive qualitative 
research strategy for gathering primary data about some aspects of the social world 
without interacting directly with its participants (Williams 2008). Compared to 
participant observation, this method provides the researcher with a relatively objective 
perspective to obtain information about research subjects. I used both methods in this 
study to combine their merits of acquiring in-depth and objective data about NGO 
alliances.  
Participant observation was performed in the NHP and the NRC. I worked as 
program manager in the NHP between June 2008 and July 2011 and participated in its 
establishment and restructuring. This position gave me an opportunity to observe the 
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entire process of alliance operation from within, as I was involved in making all 
important decisions. The main content of my observation notes included alliance 
formation, team building, grant application from foundations, interactions with the local 
government and the community, relationships among participating organizations, and the 
interactions between our alliance and other NGO partnerships. In particular, oriented as 
an NGO collaboration pilot project, the NHP governing body decided to establish an 
interactive self-evaluation plan, which encouraged me to share my observation with other 
participants for review. On the other hand, I also performed participant observation in the 
NRC between June 2008 and July 2011, as my organization joined them as an 
organization member. My observations on NRC were relatively few: I, on behalf of my 
organization, attended some important meetings, including its restructuring meeting, an 
organizational learning workshop, and three disaster management symposiums. In 
addition, I worked with the administration team on two occasions, totaling seven work 
days, and observed how the team managed alliance affairs.  
Nonparticipant observations were conducted in another three NGO alliances: 
ZVC, NGOUO, and GNRC. I worked with the administrative team of the NGOUO for 
eight days and of the ZVC for seven days as a member of an independent evaluation team, 
in May 2008 and February-March 2009 respectively. In addition to face-to-face 
interviews with alliance leaders, staff members, and volunteers, I observed how they 
organized daily work. The nonparticipant observations of the GNRC were conducted 
when my organization joined it as a regular member. Because of the failed joint action, 
my observation of this alliance totaled two work days.   
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The second method was semi-structured interview, which was applied to all 13 
alliances. This approach generates reasonably standard data across alliances but also 
allows the flexibility to probe answers deeply and collect plenty of in-depth information 
from various participants (Gall et al. 1996). For each alliance, at least two leaders or 
important team members were interviewed face-to-face or by telephone. Each interview 
lasted 30 to 90 minutes and was audio-recorded.  The core questions included:  (a) 
motives for developing alliances; (b) goals and objectives; (c) membership structure and 
management structure; (d) focus areas and strategies; (e) interactions with governments, 
foundations, and media; (f) major achievements; (f) challenges in alliance management; 
(g) causes of termination; and (h) lessons learned from the collaboration experience (see 
Appendix “Interview Questions”).  These interviews were performed between May 2008 
and February 2012. All alliances were interviewed after their dissolution, but four were 
also interviewed before the dissolution. As a result, 60 alliance leaders and important 
sponsors participated in the interviews.  
Finally, I collected archival data to obtain information supplemental to the data 
obtained from interviews and observations. Restricted by the length/depth of observations 
and biased by the observer’s position, observational data is often partial and incomplete; 
meanwhile, interview data can be flawed by inaccuracy, incompleteness, and 
communication noise. Archival data therefore can help offset such flaws by providing 
information from diverse sources. The document sources in this study included alliance 
websites, meeting minutes, program pamphlets, progress reports, self-evaluation reports, 
announcements, organization blogs, and newspaper articles.  
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Data Analysis 
Data analysis is composed of coding and categorizing, identifying similarities and 
differences, and constant comparison. Data were coded and compiled both by each 
alliance and by categories. A special file was created for each alliance, which consisted of 
related data from all three sources. Another coding system was based on different 
categories, alliance life cycles, operational modes, work areas, and environmental and 
managerial factors.   
Additionally, data triangulation was used to improve internal credibility, which 
includes two aspects: comparing data from the same type of source and between different 
types of sources. Alliances were observed in different scenarios from office work to 
board meetings and in different developmental stages from formation to dissolution. For 
a given alliance, interviewees were selected from different organizations to restrict 
institutionalized viewpoints that might bias the findings. On the other hand, data from 
different sources were compared to keep the findings consistent. For example, archival 
data were analyzed in combination with observation notes to compare similarities and 
identify discrepancies.  
An important approach to improve external validity applied in the study was the 
longitudinal observation. I have tracked the phenomenon of NGO partnerships in China 
since 2006, two year before the Sichuan Earthquake, and kept observing them even after 
the termination of the 13 relief alliances analyzed in this article. The longitudinal 
observation gives me an opportunity to go beyond individual alliances and understand the 
interactions between interorganizational collaborations and their environments from a 
systematic and long-term perspective.  
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Confidentiality 
Considering the small sector of Chinese NGOs, confidentiality is a challenge for a 
qualitative study involving important organizations and figures.  In this study, three 
measures were taken to improve confidentiality. First, no personal information (such as 
sex, nationality, employment, health, etc.) of the research subjects was collected during 
observations and interviews to reduce risk to the minimum level. Second, all observation 
and interview data were saved in a computer hard drive to which only the searcher has 
access. Audio-recorded interviews were transcribed into text in which interviewee 
information was disidentified and separately saved. Third, no interviewee’s name will 
appear in the official research report. Instead, a general title, such as “an alliance leader” 
or “an NGO leader,” was used to indicate their role in the alliance.  
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FINDINGS 
Formation of NGO Alliances after the Earthquake 
Chinese NGOs began building interorganizational partnerships in the early 2000s, 
primarily in the fields of women’s development, rural development, and the environment. 
For example, the Gender and Development of China, a national network of women’s 
NGOs, was established in 2000 to promote women’s rights and poverty reduction. After 
the outbreak of the SARS in Beijing in 2003, nine NGOs and educational organizations 
collaborated to open a hotline and provide consulting services to the public. In addition, 
50 NGOs made a joint appeal to improving biological security (Fu 2003). A local 
network, the Guizhou Development Forum, was built in Guiyang in 2004 to provide 
training service for local grassroots NGOs. For the most part, such partnerships were 
restricted to information sharing, staff training, and public education in the form of 
conferences, training workshops, Internet-based communities, and individual-based joint 
projects. In fact, few, if any, formal MOSs appeared in the nonprofit sector before the 
Sichuan Earthquake. As a result, some researchers (for example, Zhu & Chan 2009; Han 
2009) claim that the NGO collaboration era started in China when NGOs built various 
partnerships in response to the earthquake disaster in 2008.  
Some factors significantly contributed to the unprecedented growth of NGO 
alliances. First, the large number of victim needs could not be met by governments alone 
and therefore required NGO assistance. In addition to the 69,000 deaths and 19,000 lost 
people, the earthquake also caused injuries in 370,000 people. Approximately 4.8 million 
residents lost their houses, accounting for 5.4% of the total population in Sichuan 
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Province.
7
 Moreover, the rainstorm lasting two days shortly after the earthquake 
significantly aggravated victims’ suffering. Likewise, local governments were also 
seriously hit in the disaster. With the weak disaster preparedness system, their relief 
capacity to help victims was seriously undermined. Unfortunately, the mountainous 
terrain and the destroyed transportation system further compromised relief efforts by the 
provincial and central governments. Even after the entry of the armies and government-
assigned relief institutions into affected regions, earthquake victims’ diversified needs, 
such as the special needs of vulnerable groups (including the wounded and elderly, 
children, pregnant women, and ethnic minorities), mental health care, and community 
security could not be met merely by the government relief system. Therefore, the 
assistance from victims’ self-help groups, volunteers, and NGOs were needed to make up 
for the discrepancy.  
The Longmen Town where the NHP was based was an example. Only 30 
kilometers away from the epicenter, the town was fully destroyed by the earthquake. In 
addition to 14 deaths, more than 95% of the houses and all of the government office 
buildings were ruined, and the drinking water system severely damaged. Losing all of 
their possessions during the earthquake, residents lived in crowded tents and received 
limited food, clothes, and other everyday provisions from governmental allotments. The 
high need of victims became the primary reason for NHP’s entry.  
Second, the patriotism aroused by the huge disaster provided strong social 
legitimacy and resources for NGOs’ participation in the form of interorganizational 
collaboration. This huge disaster, second only to the 1976 Tangshan Earthquake in terms 
                                                            
7 See the State Overall Planning for the Post-Wenchuan Earthquake Restoration and Reconstruction (汶川
地震灾后恢复重建总体规划) released by the State Council on August 8, 2008. Refer to http://www.china-
un.org/eng/zt/earthquake20080512/t485868.htm 
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of death toll, regarded by the public as “a national calamity,” led to the striking rise of 
nationalism among the Chinese both at home and overseas. All individuals and 
organizations were encouraged to contribute to the emergency relief efforts. Volunteers 
and volunteer groups for the first time entered the public sphere in such an unprecedented 
scale that some researchers call the year of 2008 “the First Year of Chinese Volunteers.” 8 
As an important part of the voluntary sector, NGOs were granted social legitimacy for 
their engagement in this strong social ethos. Such legitimacy was critical for NGOs to 
build collective actions, especially considering that many NGOs were unregistered and 
therefore ineligible to participate in important public events as legal entities, not to 
mention build interorganizational partnerships.
9
 In addition, the fashionable patriotism 
encouraged countless individuals to volunteer and donate money and relief materials, a 
small fraction of which were channeled into NGOs and made their relief efforts practical 
in terms of resource availability. In fact, 12 of the 13 alliances collected the majority of 
relief materials and funds from the public; the only one primarily relying on foundation 
grants, the NHP, focused on community recovery. But it also benefited greatly from the 
time contribution of more than 40 long-term volunteers.  
Third, the previous experience of building cooperative relationships and the 
existing networks laid the organizational foundation for forming formal MOSs. The 
multiplication of informal partnerships since the 2000s taught NGOs the awareness and 
basics skills of developing interorganizational collaborations that were often organized 
both by region and by theme. Also, localized networks played a big part for alliance 
                                                            
8 See Jiangang Zhu, “The First Year of Chinese Volunteers and Citizens,” South Cities, July 13rd 2008. 
9 NGOs’ increased social legitimacy, the emergent nature of disaster relief, and the need of local 
governments for NGOs’ service promoted the state to temporarily loosen its regulation upon NGOs. Such a 
situation created “political opportunities” (Meyer & Minkoff 2004; Tarrow 1994) for the formation of 
NGO alliances.  
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formation after the earthquake. Among the 13 alliances, 8 were based on or connected 
with the existing NGO networks. Such networks provided participating organizations 
with personal relations and trust, which were indispensable for building formal 
partnerships in the uncertain environment. For example, the GVDRN’s major members 
were also active in the Guizhou Development Forum; the formation of the SVUR 
benefited from a local network of organizational learning.      
Fourth, information technology provided strong support for long-distance 
communication and resource mobilization. All NGO alliances utilized the Internet as an 
important tool to share information, facilitate communication and decision-making within 
the alliances, recruit volunteers, and raise relief materials. Most popular Internet-based 
instruments include websites, email groups, bulletin board systems (BBSs), blogs, and 
QQ (an online instant message program) groups. For example, the nonprofit web portal 
www.ngocn.org opened a special BBS “5/12 Earthquake Relief” a few hours after the 
earthquake. Some messages posted there were viewed as many as seven million times. 
With the help of this site, the SUO raised relief materials of more than ￥10 million and 
mobilized thousands of volunteers.   
Finally, the intention to improve the profile of the NGO sector as a whole also 
contributed to alliance establishment. Due to the state’s restriction of voluntary societies 
in the past decades, the NGO sector has long been invisible in the public sphere and little 
supported by the public. Therefore, although encouraged by patriotism like the rest of the 
society, NGOs also regarded the earthquake relief as an opportunity to increase the public 
awareness about voluntary organizations and their nonprofit causes and even to increase 
the probability of winning government support in the future. In addition, the striking 
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growth of nonprofit sectors in Japan and Taiwan after huge earthquakes strengthened the 
optimistic mentality among voluntary organizations that Chinese NGOs would have a 
similar growth after the Sichuan Earthquake. Just as an NGO leader said, “this disaster 
gave Chinese NGOs an opportunity to make a collective exhibition and demonstrate the 
significance of the voluntary sector.” The SVUR clearly expressed a similar purpose in 
its formation announcement:  
Facing the great disaster, we hope the collective action of voluntary 
societies will contribute what we can to assist the government in helping 
victims go through hard times and rebuild their homes. At the same time, 
we want to show to the entire society that NGOs are not only determined 
to assist the government in solving problems and taking social 
responsibilities. They also have the ability to take immediate and effective 
actions. 
 
Victims’ unmet needs, available political and economic resources brought about 
by patriotism, existent networks, Internet technology, and the expectation for future 
development all constituted the preconditions for NGOs to respond to the Earthquake. 
However, it is the weakness of individual NGOs that made building interorganizational 
collaborations such an important and even unavoidable choice. For example, among the 
seven member organizations in the GURG, only three had regular programs and thus full-
time staff members, and the rest were non-staffed volunteer organizations. Financial 
problems even confronted international NGOs participating in the CVDR. Though they 
had rich funding sources, using them in disaster management required special approval 
from the headquarters located overseas, usually a process too time-consuming to give 
quick response in emergency. Therefore, building interoragnizational collaboration 
became a common choice for different types of NGOs. 
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By pooling their limited resources, NGOs pursued the economics of scale and the 
effect of supplementary resources supposed in MOSs. Political legitimacy, legal 
legitimacy, access to relief materials and funds, and connections with local institutions in 
the affected regions were usually the critical resources that bound NGO partners. For 
example, in the SUO, one registered environmental NGO with government background 
was chosen to represent the alliance in government communication and finance 
management; a volunteer group having disaster management experience was sent to 
collect disaster information and investigate victim needs; a nonprofit website was in 
charge of relief material collecting and communication between the frontline teams and 
the base.  The other benefit of alliances, economics of scale, was reached by bringing 
together as many organizations as possible. In fact, the SUO and ZVC’s striking 
achievements in emergency relief were mainly attributed to their large sizes.  
Termination Patterns of NGO Alliances 
However, the conditions making alliances possible are not necessarily the same as 
those maintaining alliances, though both sets of conditions may have overlaps. Also, the 
original conditions change during alliance operation. As a result, while all 13 alliances 
were established within the first three months after the earthquake, only two of them were 
still in operation in early 2012, with the others terminated in the first or second year as 
shown in Table 1.  
Das and Teng (2012) propose a life cycle model to explain the dynamics of 
strategic alliances. An alliance usually experiences three phases: formation, operation, 
and outcome. Termination can happen in each phase. Kanter (1994) notes the influence 
of collaborative learning and transition during alliance operation. Based on their models, 
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the developmental processes of NGO alliances were analyzed and compared to find their 
similarities and differences. Four types of termination were identified: termination at 
birth, abrupt dissolution, failed transition, and evolution into independent NGOs. Their 
characteristics are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2  Four Patterns of Alliance Termination after the Sichuan Earthquake 
Termination 
Pattern 
Termination 
Time (after the 
disaster) 
Alliance Characteristics Approach Alliances 
Termination at 
birth 
1-2 week  Outside earthquake-hit 
areas; composed of 
grassroots NGOs 
Automatic dissolution 
in failed collective 
actions 
KUR 
GCSMP 
CVRC 
Abrupt 
termination 
2-4 weeks  Majority of members 
outside earthquake-hit 
areas; composed of 
grassroots NGOs 
Immediate dissolution 
after the end of 
emergency aid 
SUO 
SNHP 
XERG 
GURG 
CVFDR 
Failed 
transition 
2-12 months  Based in or close to 
earthquake-hit areas; 
led by influential NGOs 
 
Unexpected 
dissolution after the 
failure of 
institutionalizing 
partnerships for post-
disaster recovery 
GVDRN 
SVUR 
ZVC  
 
Alliance 
evolution  
3 years  Engaged by local NGOs; 
restructured after 
emergency relief; engaged 
in multiple networks 
An independent NGO 
was established to 
replace the alliance 
NHP  
CVDR 
 
Termination at birth. This type of termination occurred when an alliance failed to 
take effective collective actions after formation and just disappeared within the first 1-2 
weeks after the disaster. Three alliances, KUR, GCSMP, and CVRC, belonged to this 
category. They were established by NGOs outside the earthquake-affected region, most 
of which were grassroots organizations serving local communities.  Though developing 
formal alliance structures, such partnerships proved to be infertile in collective 
response—they failed at the very beginning.  
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GCSMP was a good example. Four days after the earthquake,
10
 15 grassroots 
NGOs in Guangdong had a meeting and decided to establish GCSMP. Considering that 
millions of migrant workers from Sichuan lived in Guangdong, GCSMP planned to take 
three measures: (a) recruit and train volunteers to provide psychological support for 
migrant workers; (b) appeal to Guangdong citizens to donate prepaid telephone cards so 
that migrant workers could call their family members living in their Sichuan hometowns; 
and (c) collect base-line data about migrant workers and their families and investigate 
their earthquake loss and needs. However, most organization made few achievements in 
these areas. The coordinating committee worked little in coordinating interorganizational 
cooperation. Participating NGOs never met again to conduct and examine joint projects 
under the banner of GCSMP; thus, the alliance was naturally dissolved. 
Abrupt termination. Alliances of this type dissolved themselves immediately 
after the end of emergency relief and include SUO, SNHP, XERG, GURG, and CVFDR. 
One of them was located in Sichuan, three in neighboring provinces, and one outside the 
earthquake-stricken region. Compared to those alliances that silently disappeared, 
terminations in this group seemed more planned and well-organized. They developed 
closure schedules, reported collective performance, and officially announced alliance 
dissolution.  
An example was the SUO. It was established in Chengdu (Sichuan’s capital) on 
the second day after the disaster by five grassroots NGO leaders, two of whom were 
based in Sichuan. Supported by the nonprofit web portal www.ngocn.org, this alliance 
quickly mobilized 24 NGOs to join its action network and made significant performance. 
                                                            
10 Compared to other emergency relief alliances, GCSMP’s formation was relatively late. This indicated the 
limited willingness and capacity of participating organizations for collective actions, which may have 
contributed to their rapid failure.  
 37 
 
 
Two weeks after its formation, however, the alliance management decided to terminate 
the partnership within next two weeks. This decision and a closure schedule were 
revealed on its website, telling contributors to stop sending relief materials. All income, 
collected materials, and office spending were unofficially audited and then released 
online to the donors, volunteers, and the public. When all this was done, a self-evaluation 
report of the alliance performance officially declared SUO’s dissolution in early June 
2008.  
Failed transition. Some alliances planned to continue their involvement in post-
disaster recovery but failed to adapt the partnership to the new situation. Of the three 
alliances that fit this pattern (GVDRN, SVUR, and ZVC), one was located in Sichuan 
and the other two in neighboring provinces. They were dissolved 2-6 months after the 
emergency relief, when most victims were displaced from stricken communities and 
resettled in temporary camps. Local governments stepped in to provide victims with 
everyday supplies while the armies were deployed in nearby camps to assist in public 
security and disaster preparedness. The publication in September 2008 of the master plan 
for post-earthquake reconstruction marked the beginning of community recovery, which 
required NGO alliances to be adaptable to the new environment. Faced with a series of 
challenges, some alliances came to an end. In addition to more comprehensive 
performance evaluations and finance disclosure, such terminations were also 
companioned with official announcements.   
For example, ZVC was one of the only two alliances based in an affected 
community. (The other is NHP). It was formed by several NGOs and company volunteer 
groups that entered the community, Zundao Town, in the first week to provide 
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emergency assistance. After its formation, two foundations and some individual 
volunteers also joined this initiative. ZVC was dedicated to direct victim services, such as 
investigating victims’ loss and basic needs, delivering relief materials, taking care of 
school children and elders, and improving sanitation in victim camps and public places. 
After the end of emergency relief, ZVC had planned to set up a permanent office in the 
community and participate in reconstruction especially in the field of livelihood 
improvement, community culture, and volunteerism improvement. However, such a plan 
failed when ZVC tried to consolidate its management structure. The termination ensued 
in May 2009 as some NGOs decided to withdraw from the community, though others 
chose to stay longer with victims.  
Alliance evolution.  Few alliances survived the challenges of partnership 
institutionalization and continued their engagement in post-disaster recovery, among 
which were CVDR and NHP. NHP was formed the second month after the disaster and 
aimed to assist victims in community recovery. Based in a seriously stricken small town, 
NHP conducted programs regarding public sanitation, mental health, child education, 
community care for elders, and livelihood improvements. The termination came when a 
community-based independent NGO was registered with the local government and 
staffed by a localized work team three years later. CVDR, on the other hand, was 
originally established in response to emergency relief. It experienced a transition after the 
emergency relief phase by reorganizing the governing body and management mechanism. 
Its core programs were also shifted to support organization members in terms of capacity 
building, information sharing, and policy advocacy. Facing the increasing loss of 
memberships three years later, it finally chose to take another organizational restructuring. 
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In early 2012, CVDR recruited a new board of directors and registered as an independent 
NGO with the municipal government, though its core programs remained the same. In 
both alliances, participating organizations signed official contracts for their memberships. 
Therefore, the decision to terminate the partnerships was also made at official meetings 
that at least core member organizations attended. 
Determinants of Alliance Termination 
As shown in the literature review, researchers examine alliance termination from 
three perspectives: environmental factors, traits of participating organizations, and 
collaboration management. Following this approach, I identify four major factors as 
accountable for alliance termination in the case of the Sichuan Earthquake, including 
political pressure, resource shortage, short-term orientation, and leadership failure.  
Combined in varying forms, these factors determined the termination of all 13 NGO 
relief alliances, though in different developmental phases.  
Political Pressure 
Voluntary societies were banned or incorporated into state-run associations after the 
formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Though they reappeared after Deng 
Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening up” policy in the early 1980s (Wang 2007), the 1989 
Tiananmen Event and the Color Revolution in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s 
significantly undermined their growth. Fearing that NGOs would be used by “foreign 
hostile forces” as agents for “Western democratization,” Chinese governments have 
implemented rigorous regulations to restrict the development of the NGO sector (Spires 
2011; Yang 2005).  
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These regulations entail formal and informal aspects. Formal regulations include 
legislative restriction and registration control. First, China has not passed a special law 
about nonprofit organizations, which makes them vulnerable in terms of legal protection. 
An administrative regulation made by the State Council in 1998, Regulation on 
Registration and Administration of Social Organizations (《社会团体登记管理条例》), 
has taken the place of legislation to prescribe nonprofit organization’s registration and 
operation. As a result, the applicability of this ordinance was practically in the hands of 
governments of all levels. Second, a dual management system was built based on the 
1998 ordinance to restrict NGOs: they need the approval of both a competent authority 
(yewu zhuguan danwei) and the Bureau of Civil Affairs (BCA) to register as an NGO 
(shehui zuzhi). A series of restrictive principles such as only-one-NGO-in-one-
administrative-district, non-competiveness, and restriction on developing branches are 
also applied to raise the threshold of registration.
11
 In addition, NGOs are annually 
inspected by the BCA and their competent authorities to determine if they can continue 
operation. In practice, their registration is often cancelled in this process for seemingly 
irrelevant reasons.  
Such regulations made many NGOs inaccessible to appropriate registration as 
social organizations or private non-enterprises; some stay unregistered at all. Among the 
13 alliances, only the SNHP has all members registered. In some alliances like the GURG 
and CVRC, most members were unregistered.
12
 
                                                            
11 Due to the high registration threshold, a high percentage of NGOs register as enterprise, affiliate 
themselves with registered organizations, or work as an unregistered group of individual volunteers.  
However, such measures make them further vulnerable in face of state oppression. See Zheng (2010) and 
Spires, Tao, and Chan (2012). 
12 Registration difficulty persisted even two years later when the government took tentative measures to 
loosen registration regulation in major cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu, and Guangzhou. 
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On the other hand, various informal measures are used to oppress and interfere in 
NGOs’ operation—especially for NGOs that are engaged in public policy advocacy and 
human rights. First, NGOs are kept invisible or blurred in public mass media so that they 
cannot build influential public image, or they are at most described as “New Lei Fengs” 
or social groups of good people and for good things. Second, NGOs are under the 
surveillance of the invisible networks of national and public securities. Programs or 
activities involved in supposedly politically sensitive issues (such as labor rights, 
democracy, and criticism of government) will be stopped or indirectly disrupted. 
Influential NGO leaders will be asked, usually in a polite manner, by policemen to report 
their activities and plans. Third, rigid strikes will be taken against uncooperative 
organizations. The owners of office buildings will be asked not to lease their real estate to 
some NGOs; slight faults in financial management will be picked out and punished 
heavily, though such faults are often caused by the absence of nonprofit law.   
Furthermore, disaster management had been the forbidden area for NGOs until 
April 2008, one month before the earthquake. Wang and Tian (2006) describe the basic 
characteristics of China's current disaster management system:  
In this system, the Party Central Committee and the State Council are in 
charge of the overall situation, with the local Party committees and 
governments taking united leadership, all the relevant functional 
departments sharing the responsibility, and the PLA, police, militia, and 
reserve forces being given full play to respond to emergency rescues. 
 
In other words, disaster management and post-disaster reconstruction are 
dominated and performed by the state. In fact, voluntary societies had been excluded 
from disaster management since the PRC’s birth due to the politicization of disaster relief. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
For example, Spires, Tao, and Chan (2012) conducted a survey between 2009 and 2010 and found “in 
Yunnan improperly registered (including completely unregistered) NGOs accounted for 66.3% of the 
provincial total. The situation was similar in Guangdong (74.6%) and in Beijing (69.6%)” (p.12). 
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In 2001 the Ministry of Civil Affairs officially confirmed NGOs’ eligibility by stating 
“Commissioned by the Department of Civil Affairs, social wellbeing organizations such 
as charitable organizations and/or private non-enterprises can be permitted to handle 
regular private donations and aid.” 13 However, such policy was mainly applied to a few 
government-controlled NGOs. Also, this ordinance blurred and restricted NGOs’ 
functions and legitimacy in disaster relief as disaster management was regarded as a 
fragment of private aid in a broad sense. The latest statute was released by the ministry in 
April 2008, declaring that “NGOs with the mission of disaster relief” can be permitted to 
participate in relief efforts under certain conditions.
14
 However, this statute did not bring 
about improved eligibility for NGOs’ engagement because they could not register as 
disaster management organizations before its enactment. As a consequence, NGOs must 
be aware of the risk when they were involved in disaster management: they might be 
punished during annual inspections with the charge of engaging in activities beyond their 
stated missions.  
Political pressure upon NGOs has not been loosened even after the earthquake 
took place. Generally, the state took the following measures to restrict NGOs’ 
participation in emergency relief and community recovery.  
First, government agencies tried to control the participation of all volunteers and 
NGOs. The Communist Youth League (CYL) was assigned to register and supervise 
volunteers and volunteer groups. The civil affairs administrations managed donations 
                                                            
13 The Ministry of Civil Affairs, Aug. 31, 2001, An Instruction on Promoting Regular Private Donation 
Activities (《民政部关于进一步开展经常性社会捐助活动的意见》) (No.33).   
14 For example, in "Administrative Measures for Disaster Relief Donations (《救灾捐赠管理办法》)," 
Article 11 reads that “If in need, donations received by the civil affairs administrations above the county 
level can be trusted to social welfare agencies and licensed charitable organizations to deal with”. At the 
same time, Article 23 states that “the licensed charitable organizations should develop the donation 
distribution plan based on the governmental evaluation of relief needs and submit it to the local government 
as a record. The plan should be conducted under the government’s supervision.”   
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from government-associated enterprises and social groups and coordinated their relief 
efforts.  NGOs were supposed to report to the civil affairs administrations but were 
actually excluded from the government-dominated relief system—the supervisory 
organizations were too busy managing government relief projects and tended to neglect 
NGOs.  
Second, government-affiliated NGOs crowded out independent NGOs. The Red 
Cross Society of China, a nominally voluntary society but actually a ministry in the 
central government, and the China Charity Federation, another nominally voluntary 
society affiliated with the Ministry of Civil Affairs as a quasi-ministry agency, were 
designated to receive private donations and relief materials from overseas and domestic 
sources. Independent NGOs could participate in the earthquake relief but were required 
to work under the leadership of either organization.     
The third measure was substitution and incorporation. Realizing the value of 
voluntary societies, some local governments built their own volunteer teams. For 
example, the MZ Volunteer Association, an affiliate to the local CYL, was a shell 
organization. During the earthquake relief, the association recruited local volunteers and 
established eight volunteer teams. Other governments incorporated cooperative volunteer 
groups and grassroots NGOs into their own systems. Zundao Town ZVC’s base, was a 
small town with a population of 22,000. The earthquake caused 482 deaths in this town, 
including four township government officials. Seriously stricken during the disaster, the 
government enthusiastically welcomed and supported volunteers and NGOs’ involvement 
in addressing emergency. They designated the township CYL to join the ZVC and serve 
as the government’s liaison with ZVC. After the end of emergency relief, the government 
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planned to retain the ZVC but keep it under control by restructuring the governing body. 
A three-member committee composed of the mayor, associate mayor, and a 
representative of ZVC was created to supervise the restructured ZVC. However, the 
marginalization of NGOs in this new framework aroused strong discontent.  
Finally, uncooperative NGOs were ostracized from the quake-hit regions. With 
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games approaching and the start of post-disaster 
reconstruction, NGOs were seen as “social instability forces” and expelled from the 
stricken communities. For example, the CYL in MZ County stipulated in an official 
document: 
When the first anniversary of the 512 Event is approaching, a number of 
volunteers will enter MZ. Some ill-intentioned people under the cloak of 
volunteers will perform activities to undermine social stability…  
Individual volunteers and volunteer groups in the following categories will 
be asked to leave MZ: (a) those who cannot verify their legal identities; (b) 
those without volunteer identity cards and recommendation letters (from 
government agencies); and (c) those who don’t volunteer, or whose 
service doesn’t match local needs.  
 
Actually, this stipulation directly led to the breakdown of the ZVC. Retaliating 
against the unruly NGOs, the township government refused to give them 
recommendation letters. Their only choice was to declare withdrawal from ZD; the 
alliance came to an end shortly before the first anniversary of the earthquake.  
Confronted with the comprehensively oppressive system, it is understandable that 
NGOs must be very alert to potential political risks. Many “experienced” organizations 
even developed a set of self-testing measures for their everyday practice to keep safe. 
Also, being clearly aware that voluntary associations have been a taboo for the post-
communist state, NGO leaders assumed that multiple-organizational collaborations 
would bring about greater political risks than individual organizations. Therefore, two 
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strategies were used to alleviate political pressures upon relief alliances. (a) Using the 
rhetoric of volunteerism to reduce the linguistic sensitiveness of NGOs. Reading from 
government-controlled media that volunteers were encouraged to participate in 
emergency relief, NGOs joined the alliances as individual volunteers rather than as 
organization members or at least claimed they were volunteers while in face of 
government agencies or media. At the same time, they tried to avoid such words as 
“NGO” or “lianmeng (alliance)” in the alliance titles. Instead, “minjian zuzhi (civil 
society),” “zhiyuanzhe (volunteer),” and “lianhe xingdong (collective relief efforts)” 
became chosen words because of their politically friendly meanings. (b) Using a 
registered organization as the host of the alliance. Considering many member 
organizations were not registered, such a host could improve the legitimacy of the 
partnership by taking care of financial and administrative issues. (c) Focusing on raising 
relief materials rather than funds. Though raising materials was illegal for NGOs that had 
no permission in disaster management, raising funds without permission would bring 
much bigger troubles if charged by the police. The risk of heavy punishment against 
illegal fundraising led most alliances to accept grants from foundations only and refuse 
private donors. If the public wanted to donate money, they would be asked to purchase 
relief materials or help pay transportation fees. (d) Developing many “don’ts,” such as 
not getting involved in any rescue activities threatening personal safety, not releasing or 
spreading any negative comments about the government, and not releasing important 
disaster information before the authorities’ verification. (e) Self-dissolving before the 
arrival of punishment. To reduce the risk of government surveillance, some alliances 
dissolved themselves shortly after emergency relief.  
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Despite these safeguard measures, the ubiquitous political pressure as a critical 
part of NGOs’ environment obviously impacted all alliances and their members, though 
the extent might vary. Even the most successful alliances clearly felt this pressure, just as 
a leader of the CVDR said: 
We invited Taiwanese NGO counterparts to introduce their successful 
experience in building NGO federations after the Chi-Chi Earthquake the 
first month after the Sichuan Earthquake. Their post-disaster recovery 
practice set a good example for us. However, we soon realized that the 
government would not tolerate NGOs to build such strong alliances in 
mainland China.  
 
Another story happened to the SUO. Two weeks after SUO started, some 
policemen came to its office and accused the main coordinator of “illegally raising funds.” 
Though the coordinator was released four days later without being formally charged, this 
incident prompted the SUO to close down soon.  
Resource Shortage 
Despite political risks, resource shortage has been another great challenge for the 
Chinese NGO sector since its revival in the 1980s. First, foundation grants have been 
scarce. Only public foundations are permitted to raise money from the public. However, 
NGOs can hardly benefit from their grants because almost all public foundations were 
affiliated with the government.
 15
  On the other hand, despite their small population, most 
private foundations are operating foundations and do not make grants to NGOs.
16
 Second, 
grant sources from overseas were cut off by the government. Foreign grants had been the 
                                                            
15 Such a situation was slightly improved after the Sichuan Earthquake. One of the biggest public 
foundations, the Red Cross Foundation, launched a pilot program in 2008 to fund NGOs’ engagement in 
community recovery. However, it suspended such a practice one year later. Another public foundation, the 
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, began its regular grant program since 2009. But they are 
exceptions for the total 1,029 public foundations (Note: the number in 2011).  
16 A few pioneering private foundations did begin to play the role of ice breakers. For example, the Narada 
Foundation, an independent grant maker founded by a corporation, has aimed to support NGOs after its 
birth in 2007. It funded more than 80 NGOs in capacity building, victim service, and community research 
after the Sichuan Earthquake. See Kang (2009). 
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main source for Chinese NGOs, though 85% foreign aid was channeled into governments 
(Spires 2011). However, the limited resources were cut off in an ordinance released by 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) in December 2009. According to 
this ordinance, the receiver of foreign grant must present the registration materials of the 
grant maker and get such materials verified by Chinese governments.
17
 It proved an 
impossible task for most NGOs to fulfill because of complicated time-consuming 
procedures and their limited linguistic skills. Third, NGOs have few, if any, accesses to 
government contracts. Though some cities took initiatives in subcontracting social 
organizations mainly with social welfare projects, only government-supported 
organizations could win in bidding.  
Limited funding sources caused serious financial and staff inadequacy in NGOs
18
 
and definitely restricted alliance capacity. But the high demands of victims after the 
earthquake did not help alleviate the rigid restriction in fundraising. A small 
improvement in fundraising restriction was only for public foundations: in addition to the 
two state-run organizations, the RCSC and the CCF, the other 16 national public 
foundations were also allowed to raise money from the public for earthquake relief. 
However, NGOs were still excluded. Moreover, seeing some individuals and 
organizations did collect private donations without government permission, the State 
Council Office released an ordinance one month later after the earthquake. In Article 3 it 
reads “Fund raised by other types of institutions or organizations should be transferred to 
                                                            
17 SAFE, 2009, “Notice on Foreign Exchange Management in Domestic Organizations ”(《国家外汇管理
局关于境内机构捐赠外汇管理有关问题的通知》) 
18 Hu (2012) finds that the average annual spending of NGOs in the Pearl River Delta is between ￥30,000 
and ￥100,000. In a sample of 263 NGOs in Beijing, Yunnan, and Guangdong, the three NGO host spots, 
Spires, Tao, and Chan (2012, p.13) find that “A full 28% had zero full-time paid staff members. Another 45% 
of groups had full-time staff sizes of between one and six, with the majority clustering in the range of 2-4 
staff.”  
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the special bank accounts managed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the RCSC, or the 
CCF.” 19 As a result, more than 80% of the total earthquake relief donation (including 
cash and relief materials) of ￥ 76 billion ($11.2 billion) finally flowed into governments’ 
bank accounts (Deng 2009).  
It is understandable that the donations received by NGOs were very slight, which 
was reflected by the outcomes of NGO alliances as shown in Table 1. While two large 
alliances, SUO and ZVC, raised materials of about ￥10 million and mobilized hundreds 
of volunteers, most alliances just received much smaller quantities. They consequently 
were confronted with three challenges due to limited resources.  
First, alliances had no funding to support full-time staff. As shown in Table 3, 
only two alliances finally developed employee teams, though in the community recovery 
phase. But during emergency relief, all alliances were staffed only by volunteers-- 
alliance leaders also served as volunteers. In fact, many NGOs temporarily suspended 
their regular programs and shifted to earthquake management. However, such 
organizational volunteering would never persist long since they could not get funding for 
disaster relief. To keep volunteers in their positions as a temporary substitute to staff 
members, some alliances provided them with limited amounts of stipend, ranging from 
￥300 to ￥1,200 per month. However, even such small subsidies often became a big 
challenge for alliance leaders.   
The second problem was the inadequacy of administrative budget. Among the 13 
alliances, only seven obtained small amounts of administration grants from foundations, 
private donors, or corporation donors. Obviously, such amounts were far from adequate 
                                                            
19 The State Council Office, “Ordinance on Sichuan Earthquake Donation Management,” June 13, 2008. 
(关于汶川地震抗震救灾捐赠资金使用指导意见) 
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for long-term operation. In addition, the opportunity of receiving new grants significantly 
declined when the public’s patriotic mentality for the earthquake relief faded away after 
the first three months.  
The shortage of program funding was the same great, if not greater, challenge. 
This challenge was especially insurmountable for those with the attempt to participate in 
community recovery. Though they managed to collect large amounts of relief materials, 
raising materials for reconstruction was another question: private donors were usually 
interested in responding to victims’ pressing needs rather than long-term needs. On the 
other hand, foundations preferred individual organizations to interorganizational 
collaborations for the unclarity of responsibility inevitably lied in the latter.  A good 
example is the CVDR. Its leader was clearly told by a foundation representative during 
an inquisition: “We will like to give the CVDR a grant if you register as an independent 
organization.”  
Even those alliances having various funding sources felt the strong threat of 
resource shortage. Having two corporate giants, one foundation, and tens of NGOs as 
members, ZVC supposedly was the strongest alliance in terms of financial capacity. 
During emergency relief, ZVC collected relief materials of nearly ￥10 million from 
sources such as foundations, companies, private donors, social clubs, and even some 
government agencies. A private foundation provided a grant of ￥50,000 to support 
administration fees, adding to another grant of ￥10,000 donated by an entrepreneur. In 
addition, the ZVC launched a fundraising project by selling postage stamps within its 
network. Even so, ZVC was still faced with grant inadequacy, as it described in a self-
evaluation report released in September 2008: 
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Funding shortage is seriously affecting volunteers’ engagement. If we 
move forward to the long-term plan, we will need more financial and 
material support to pay project costs, administration fees, and volunteer 
subsides.  
 
Alliances took many measures to alleviate resource shortage. Some alliances 
simply put fundraising restriction aside and publicly raised money through Internet tools. 
For example, GVDRN received about ￥ 82,000 by publicizing an individual bank 
account in some Internet-based communities. Of course, protective means were also used: 
(a) donors could acquire access to donation information and thus track the use of 
collected money; (b) a finance statement was released to demonstrate accountability 
when the alliance was dissolved. Other relatively cautious alliances played “touch ball” 
by raising money through personal network such as friends, relatives, and volunteers. In 
this sense, they did not violate fundraising regulation because such donors differed from 
the public. In addition, they tried to find free service to reduce operating costs. For 
example, SUO, CVDR, and ZVC found free warehouses provided by business owners or 
governments to keep relief materials; some drivers transported materials for free; 
volunteers often donated money to pay administrative fees. When all these efforts 
became futile, closure became the only choice for alliance leaders.  
Short-Term Orientation 
Short-term orientation was the first internal factor leading to alliance termination. 
NGOs built interoragnizational collaborations to go across the participation threshold for 
effective disaster management that was set high for individual organizations. However, 
aware of various limitations, some alliances developed a clear timeline for their 
participation. Among the five alliances that experienced abrupt termination, four were set 
as “task-oriented” (McLaughlin 2010). They were created to meet emergent needs in the 
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earthquake relief rather than to take part in the entire process of disaster management. 
Member organizations reached the agreement during alliance formation that the alliance 
would be terminated shortly after the end of emergency relief.  
Such short-term orientation was reflected through mission expressions and work 
areas.  Missions in alliances located outside earthquake-affected regions usually focused 
on providing material support. For example, the SNHP stated its mission:   
SNHP is an alliance composed of four social welfare organizations and 
one nonprofit magazine. We mobilize social support, collect necessities 
for emergency relief work, and send them to the earthquake-hit areas 
through formal channels.   
 
XERG’s mission was depicted as “mobilizing citizen engagement and collecting 
materials that are greatly needed in front-line relief teams in Sichuan.”  
In contrast, alliances in earthquake-affected regions placed more emphasis on 
direct service.  For example, though finally evolving into an independent NGO, CVDR’s 
early mission shows some degree of short-term orientation with its emphasis on direct 
service:  
CVDR assists NGOs and volunteers engaged in emergency relief with 
information service and provide technological support in terms of 
volunteer training and management.  
  
Short-term orientation was also demonstrated in work areas. XERG clearly 
described its work areas in its poster: 
Following the life-saving cycle in earthquake disasters, XERG will collect 
relief materials in about ten days. We only accept materials on our list of 
necessities. Donated money will be used to purchase medicine. 
 
As the only alliance located in Sichuan but dissolved shortly after the disaster, 
SUO had four work areas: (a) collecting relief materials and money; (b) providing 
warehouse service for other NGOs outside Sichuan; (c) investigating victims’ needs and 
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deploying aid materials; and (d) assisting nonmember organizations and volunteers in 
relief engagement.  
Several factors contributed to the short-term orientation. The first factor was 
geological distance. Located outside disaster areas, NGOs would face unbearable 
operational costs if engaged in the long-term post-disaster recovery. Geological distance 
also created low commitment in disaster management among participating organizations, 
especially when the patriotism and nationalism that was aroused by the discourse of 
national calamity soon faded in unaffected areas. In contrast, alliances located in affected 
areas generally had higher commitment in post-disaster engagement. For example, a 
coordinator of the GCSMP made reflection on why the alliance was terminated with 
barren achievements:  
I think geographic closeness mattered a lot. Our province is very far from 
Sichuan. Therefore, citizens, including NGO people, are not concerned 
about victims as much as Sichuan people, or people in Sichuan’ 
neighboring provinces like Guizhou, Chongqing, and Shanxi. If such a 
disaster happened here, I am sure we will do much more. For example, 
NGOs achieved a lot through collective actions early this year when local 
people suffered in the freezing weather.  
 
The conflict of work areas was another reason for short-term orientation. Due to 
eligibility restriction by the government, few NGOs included disaster management in 
their work areas before the earthquake. Therefore, joining relief alliances was just a 
temporary deviation from their regular programs. They had to go back to their original 
tracks immediately after emergency relief. In fact, among the 13 alliances, eight did not 
have any member organizations that had conducted disaster management projects before 
the earthquake. GURG explained the influence of work area difference in a self-
evaluation report:  
 53 
 
 
No one member of GURG focused on disaster management. But this huge 
disaster required NGOs to respond to with efficiency. Therefore, the 
difference between disaster relief and their original focus areas caused two 
problems: (a) they had no experience and capacity in emergency relief; (b) 
they tried to fuse their previous focus areas into disaster management but 
compromised victims’ real needs.  
 
In addition, unlike their counterparts in affected regions, organizations outside 
major affected areas had few opportunities to shift to the new field of disaster 
management because of supposedly scarce funding.   
Therefore, when emergency relief was coming to an end in late May, alliances 
with short-term orientation naturally chose to close down. In an announcement released 
on its website, SUO clearly stated its reason for termination.  
The significance of emergency relief efforts will decline. Government 
supplies can be effectively delivered into earthquake-hit areas (to meet 
victims’ needs). The key of disaster management in a long time will be 
disease control, resettlement, and reconstruction. After cautious and in-
depth discussions, the SUO decided to put an end to our current work 
before May 30. We will release our financial statement within one month.  
 
Another alliance leader made a brief conclusion for the closure: “We established 
the alliance to collect relief materials. Now its mission has finished.” 
Leadership Failure 
The second internal factor influencing alliance termination is leadership. 
According to Ospina and Sorenson (2007), there are basically two types of leadership: 
collaborative leadership and individual leadership. While the traditional model of 
leadership focuses on the role of individual leaders, the constructionist model suggests 
that as the property of the social system, collaborative leadership creates the conditions 
and mechanisms for all participants to address collective problems (Huxham & Vangen 
2000). In this study, two types of leadership both influenced alliance stability.  
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First, partner misfit impacted alliance durability. Daz and Teng (1999) argue that 
partner misfit during partner selection will be conducive to relational risk and undermine 
success in strategic alliances. This argument also proved to be applicable to NGO 
alliances. Most relief alliances were established immediately after the earthquake and 
therefore had no time to select partners. Also, the small population of NGOs gave little 
space for organizers to choose partners. As a result, membership was open in most 
alliances. A typical process of partner recruitment went like this. Alliance organizers 
(usually leaders in the local NGO sector) first contacted other leaders and discussed 
developing an alliance in response to the disaster. Reaching an agreement on this plan in 
a small circle, organizers sent invitations to other NGO leaders to have a meeting in 
which the alliance would be officially declared as founded. All attending organizations 
would be recognized as founding members. A preliminary management structure would 
be determined to coordinate member organizations’ relief work. Then, the management 
would release a public appeal to other NGOs and volunteer groups and ask them to join 
joint relief efforts. This resulted in unclear membership in most alliances. For example, 
the SUO was initiated by two small Internet-based NGOs but soon attracted another four 
organizations through the organizers’ personal networks. Its open appeal on the Internet 
was answered by more than 100 NGOs and volunteer groups.  
Unclear membership brought about a series of challenges for managing partner fit. 
The first challenge came from resource fit, the degree “to which partners possess 
compatible resources, that is, resources that can be effectively integrated into a value-
creating strategy” (Das and Teng 1999, p.56). Good resource fit served as the foundation 
for any effective collaboration. Successful NGO alliances were well equipped with three 
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types of basic resources: legitimacy, access to economic resources (materials or funds), 
and volunteer labor. Legitimacy provided protection against political pressure, access to 
economic resources allowed alliances to raise relief materials and fund to support 
collective projects, and volunteers were critical in project management and service 
delivery. A good example was the ZVC. The local government’s support in the initial 
phase provided strong legitimacy for NGOs’ collaboration. The local CYL acted as the 
liaison between the government and ZVC. The mayor often attended ZVC’s meetings 
and invited ZVC to give assistance in government relief projects. With respect to 
economic resources, ZVC’s leadership was composed of NGO leaders, foundation 
officers, and senior business managers. Well connected with sponsor communities, the 
leadership managed to mobilize donations of ￥10 million. Finally, because of the 
network of NGOs and the power of Internet-based virtue communities, more than 400 
volunteers were recruited locally and outside.      
In contrast, futile alliances, especially those that failed at birth, apparently 
suffered from resource misfit. The KUR was founded by three NGOs (including the NGO 
gate website www.ngocn.org) and one volunteer network. Their work areas included 
NGO information and networking, gay rights, youth development, and basic education. 
Only one of them was registered, but it was still under close government surveillance. 
Mainly affected by the inadequate legitimacy, the alliance leaders decided to only use 
personal networks in collecting materials and funds. Therefore, the leaders’ private 
networks became the major sources for economic resources. Third, the limited 
connections of founding organizations with the public affected volunteer recruitment.   
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Although a critical condition for a productive alliance, resource fit could not 
ensure its durability alone. Alliance stability also requires strategic fit, the degree “to 
which partners have compatible goals in the alliance” (Das &Teng 1999, p.56). Strategic 
misfit might not significantly affect alliances with short-term orientations because they 
conducted the relatively simple task of collective relief; however, it obviously threatened 
alliances that planned to participate in post-disaster reconstruction. For example, the 
founding organizations of SUO had expected to restructure the partnership for 
community recovery but soon found they diverged on future program directions. Some 
organizations wanted to develop a disaster preparedness center, while the others tried to 
build a community-based platform to assist victims in reconstruction and also facilitate 
more NGOs’ engagement. The unresolved controversy resulted in the abrupt dissolution 
of the entire alliance. On the other hand, high strategic fit obviously improved the 
durability in NHP. One month after the earthquake, three original members of the SUO 
and another outsider organization created the NHP with the purpose of assisting victims 
in community recovery. After several investigations and in-depth discussions among 
founding members, a fully shared strategy was developed: NHP would build a work 
station in the community and directly serve earthquake victims through a participatory 
approach. To ensure the fulfillment of this strategy, four partners signed a contract that 
clarified their roles in the partnership. A well-networked NGO was in charge of 
fundraising; a community development NGO provided volunteer training and field work 
supervision; the other two local organizations gave support in legal legitimacy and 
finance management. The management regularly met and evaluated the strategy’s 
applicability.  
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Finally, mission fit proved to be most critical for the long-term collaboration 
among NGOs. I define mission fit as the degree to which partners have compatible 
missions in the alliance. Unlike for-profit organizations, NGOs are driven not by profit 
but by public good and exist in a community of values (Brody 1987; Payton & Moody 
2008). Conflicting missions among organization partners contributed to termination even 
in alliances equipped with good resource fit and strategic fit. ZVR was a good example. 
After the first three months of collaborative efforts in emergency management, member 
organizations agreed that ZVC should focus on integrated community recovery and 
development, including livelihood improvement, cultural enhancement, and volunteer 
training. However, mission conflict gradually became significant and resulted in internal 
division among partners. One major controversy happened when the township 
government tried to reinforce its control upon ZVC by establishing a leadership 
committee in charge of ZVC. NGOs contended that ZVC should be independent from the 
government while volunteer groups with business backgrounds claimed that 
government’s leadership would increase ZVC’s legitimacy and enhance organizational 
performance. With the final formation of the committee, the conflict between the two 
groups was rooted. Several months later, another conflict regarding community recovery 
strategies deepened the division. NGOs emphasized the importance of small projects in 
recovering household economy, while enterprise volunteers supported the agricultural 
industrialization method to pursue economics of scale; NGOs stressed villagers’ 
participation in decision-making, while enterprise volunteers preferred the efficiency of 
top-down mobilization. Eventually, these conflicts ended with NGOs’ withdrawal from 
ZVC.  
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However, the impact of partner fit changes by alliance objective and over time. 
Complex objectives were more vulnerable to partner misfit than simple objectives. 
CVDR was composed of six international NGOs, eighteen local NGOs, four foundations, 
three volunteer groups, and three Internet enterprises. Reaching an agreement among 
such a diverse group of members was very challenging. But VCDR did realize good 
partner fit by setting very simple objectives for the collaboration: it focused on 
information sharing and volunteer training. On the other hand, partner fit within an 
alliance could change over time. For example, when reconstruction began at ZD and 
required large amounts of funding, NGOs’ advantage in mobilizing volunteers became 
less important and thus resulted in the decline of partner fit in ZVC.  
In addition to partnership misfit, failed governance also contributed to alliance 
termination. Provan and Kenis (2007) identify three types of governance in 
interorganizational partnerships: shared governance (type I), lead organization (type II), 
and network administrative organization (type III). In the shared governance mode, the 
alliance is governed directly by members without separate governance entity. For NGO 
alliances, shared governance means important decisions are made by a council of 
representatives from all parties. The lead organization mode occurs when one 
organization plays the role of alliance leader. Finally, members may set up a separate 
administrative entity to manage the alliance, as seen in the administrative organization 
mode.  Among the 13 relief alliances, seven used single government modes and the other 
six applied a mix of two or more modes as shown in Table 3.  
Eight alliances were governed directly by all members, which reflected the strong 
mentality of equal participation in the NGO sector. However, such equality risked 
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compromising efficiency in decision making, especially when the alliance had a large 
membership. Therefore, alliances with more than 10 organization members tended not to 
use this method alone, such as the CVDR, SVUR, and GVDRN. In some cases, shared 
government would fail in reaching any agreement without strong mutual trust among 
members. For example, eight small NGOs and volunteer organizations that had no 
previous collaborative relationships created the CVUDR after the earthquake. At the 
formation meeting, the participating organizations built a governing group composed of 
leaders from each member. However, the CVDR failed to convene a second meeting to 
move forward until its termination. Even combined with the lead organization mode in its 
governance structure, SVUR’s leader complained the complexity of shared governance:  
Because of our emphasis on equal participation, major decisions were 
made at the meeting when all members attended. However, we must also 
consider the expertise of each partner because they had different staff sizes 
and organizational merits. This process was much more challenging than 
when a single organization performed all the tasks…we finally decide to 
terminate the alliance when the complexity became unbearable for us.   
 
To reduce the complexity of the shared governance, some alliances created a 
special administrative organization to make decisions on behalf of the member council. 
But this mode had a disadvantage: the durability and performance of the alliance would 
primarily depend on the administrative group. In fact, the only two alliances to use this 
mode, GCSMP and SUO, were both terminated before the start of post-disaster 
reconstruction. But four other alliances applying a mixed mode persisted.  
When most members lacked experience and resources in relief management, the 
lead organization played an important role in managing the partnership. Four alliances 
applied this governance mode, including ZVC, NHP, XERG, and CVRC. Lead 
organizations were usually well-staffed, well-connected with grant makers and private 
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donors, and influential in the local NGO sectors. They contributed to alliance durability 
in terms of legitimacy, grants, management skills, and labor support. However, using this 
mode alone might undermine equality and lead to discontent among other members. A 
NGO leader explained why her organization withdrew from CVRC:  
I was called by some NGO leaders to attend a meeting and discuss 
establishing an alliance. But after arriving at the meeting room, I found 
important decisions about alliance governance and strategies had been 
made by them alone. We soon quit the alliance because we disagreed with 
their strategies and working styles.  
 
To offset the disadvantages of the single governance mode, some alliances used a 
mixed mode. Generally, using a mixed mode was more common than solitary modes, but 
alliance durability also depended on the size and goal of the alliance. For example, 
CVDR combined shared governance and an administrative committee; the committee 
was in charge of everyday management and minor decisions, while a plenary meeting, 
which was opened once a year, decided the election of the committee and made major 
decisions. SUVR mixed shared governance and lead organization to balance equality and 
efficiency. NHP even built a governing structure combining all three modes: a 
supervisory committee was composed of leaders from each of four partners, a special 
executive team was in charge of regular programs, and finally, the lead organization 
played the “firefighter” role in internal tensions.  
With respect to individual leadership, alliance leaders were found to have 
significant impact on partnership durability. Though almost all people in the lead 
positions were local NGO leaders, they varied in terms of leadership skills, personal 
networks, and prestige. Generally, renowned leaders were more likely to make up for the 
disadvantages of the partnership (and hence, sustain an alliance) than junior leaders. For 
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example, CVDR’s main coordinator was a senior nonprofit consultant in Sichuan. She 
developed strong personal relationships with grant makers and NGOs and was highly 
regarded among her peers for her high commitment to NGO development. Under her 
leadership, CVDR began with environmental scanning and developed collaboration rules. 
This strategy served three purposes: to reduce political risks, to improve members’ sense 
of belonging, and to reduce the risk of internal tensions. When members’ engagement in 
the partnership significantly declined after emergency relief, her prestige helped keep 
them connected in collective activities. In addition, she managed to raise grants to 
support the CVDR’s programs and overhead costs because of her good private relations 
with foundations.  
In contrast, the termination at birth in CVRC, GCSMP, and KUR could be tracked 
to their less capable leaders. Take GCSMP for an example. This alliance was initiated by 
several young NGO leaders. For some personal reasons, the most prestigious leaders in 
the local NGO sector were not engaged in this initiative. Without senor leaders’ 
participation, volunteer groups and small NGOs became the majority of the alliance. This 
meant the alliance could not share the critical resources such as media, funding, and 
government support, which were usually connected with senior leaders. The limited 
prestige of young leaders also restricted their capacity to mobilize the NGO community 
for their engagement. Finally, their strategy of assisting migrant workers proved to be 
futile.
  
 
 
Table 3  Determinants for Alliance Termination 
Alliance 
Abbr. 
Political 
Pressure 
Staff Status Admin. 
Grant 
a
  
Short-Term 
Orientation 
Partnership Fit 
 
Governance 
Mode 
 
Individual 
Leadership 
 Full-
time 
Volunteers Resources Strategy Mission 
SUO  High 0 200 23,000 Yes High Intermediate Low III Intermediary 
CVDR  Low 3b 40 10,0000+ 
50,000c 
No Low High Intermediate I +  III High 
ZVC High 0 400 About 
60,000 
No High High Low II + III Intermediate 
NHP Low 4d 50 70,000 No High High Intermediate I+ II +III High 
KUR High 0 15 0 N/A Low Intermediate Low I Low 
XERG  Intermediate 0 30 0 Yes High Intermediate Low II Intermediate 
SVUR  Low 0 40 50,000 No High High Intermediate I +II High 
SNHP Intermediate 0 10 0 Yes High High Low I Intermediate 
GCSMP Low 0 10 0 N/A Low Intermediate Low III Low 
GURG  Intermediate 0 15 About 
3,000 
Yes Low Intermediate Low I +II Low 
CVRC High 0 15 0 N/A Low Low Low II Intermediate 
CVUDR Intermediate 0 20 0 No Intermediate Intermediate Low I Low 
GVDRN Intermediate 0 30 20,000 No High Intermediate Intermediate I +III Intermediate 
 
a. Here I only listed the numbers of the first year because most alliances were terminated in the first year. 
b. CVDR recruited the first full-time staff member in late 2008. 
c. CVDR received a total of ￥50,000 during emergency relief (May 15-June 14, 2008).  
d. NHP began to recruit the first full-time employee in August, 2009, one year after its formation.  
 
6
2
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Determinants and Termination Patterns 
In the previous text, I identified four factors accounting for the termination of 13 
NGO alliances after the Sichuan Earthquake: political pressure, resource shortage, short-
term orientation, and leadership failure. Further analysis found that the different patterns 
of alliance termination could be explained by certain combinations of these factors. The 
primary associations between termination patterns and determinants are presented in 
Table 4.  
Table 4   Patterns and Determinants of NGO Alliances’ Termination 
Pattern of 
Termination 
Political 
Pressure 
Resource 
Shortage 
Short-Term 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Failure 
Failure at Birth  ×  × 
Abrupt Dissolution × × ×  
Failed Transition × ×  × 
Evolution into  
Independent NGOs 
 ×  × 
 
        In particular, it was resource shortage and leadership failure that served as the major 
reasons for the termination at birth. Abrupt dissolution was mainly caused by political 
pressure, resource shortage, and short-term orientation. Generally exempt from short-
term orientation, failed transition came out as the result of political pressure, resource 
shortage, and leadership failure. Finally, alliances that dissolved themselves in a 
relatively successful manner—evolving into independent organizations—still suffered 
from resource shortage and leadership failure as they overcame political pressure and 
short-term orientation in some extent.   
        In addition, all four factors actually contributed to alliance termination of each 
pattern, though whether they acted as primary or secondary factors varied. While 
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resource shortage and leadership failure primarily caused the termination at birth, 
political pressure and short-term orientation also played roles as the secondary 
determinants, as shown in the cases of KUR and GCSMP. Political pressure decreased 
NGOs’ willingness to engagement in disaster relief during alliance formation; short-term 
orientation reinforced the low engagement willingness when the alliance was in difficulty 
and accelerated its final dissolution. Similarly, leadership failure served as a secondary 
determinant for abrupt termination while the alliances suffered more from political 
pressure, resource shortage, and short-term orientation; for alliances that failed in 
transition, short-term orientation was a secondary determinant; and finally, political 
pressure and short-term orientation acted as secondary contributors in the alliances that 
evolved into independent NGOs. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Through the case study of 13 NGO alliances formed after the Sichuan Earthquake 
in China, this article reveals that four termination patterns existed among these 
interorganizational partnerships: failure at birth, abrupt dissolution, failed transition, and 
evolution into independent organizations. Furthermore, four factors—political pressure, 
resource shortage, short-term orientation, and leadership failure—are identified as 
accountable for alliance termination, though through different combinations in each 
pattern. In this sense, environmental conditions and internal management challenges both 
caused alliance termination in the nonprofit sector.  
Theoretically, an alliance can be terminated across both ends of the spectrum of 
interorganizational partnership: they can become individual organizations or informal 
networks as they are before alliance formation or evolve into a highly integrated structure 
such as a federation or merger (Mclaughlin 2010; Provan 1983). Some authors have 
indicated the possibility of building federations or mergers among nonprofit 
organizations (Selsky 1998; Singer 1991; Wernet & Jones 1992). However, alliances in 
this empirical study proceeded along just one end: all were dissolved into individual 
organizations or informal networks.  Although two independent NGOs were established 
due to the previous alliances, they served merely as individual organizations rather than 
interorganizational structures. In other words, the formal cooperative relationships among 
participating organizations were weakened rather than strengthened after alliance 
operation in 13 all alliances. The study explores why these alliances went backwards 
from their previous statuses, including political pressure, resource shortage, short-term 
orientation, and leadership failure. However, such reasons are inadequate to explain why 
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they failed to evolve into collaboration of higher levels such as federations or mergers. 
The reason is simple: failure factors differ from success elements, though very often they 
are highly associated. On the other hand, some practical associations between alliance 
and federation/merger are still unclear: Must a more centralized structure be based upon a 
previous alliance? Will the structure begin directly from individual organizations and 
skip the alliance operation process?  
Another area deserving further discussion is the associations among the four 
determinants of alliance termination.  Though the study did not aim to learn if they 
impacted each other, the limited data indicates the existence of such associations. In 
addition to its direct influence upon alliances, political pressure indirectly contributed to 
resource shortage and short-term orientation. Government restriction deprived NGOs of 
fundraising eligibility; punishment risk even kept many NGOs from collecting relief 
materials. Moreover, registration failure in NGOs often made private foundations 
cautious of funding their proposals, as shown in CVDR’s case. Political pressure also 
enhanced short-term orientation in the case of SUO, ZVC, and KUR. Fearful of 
government raking-up measures after emergency management, these alliances applied the 
“first come, first leave” strategy before they were actually faced with political challenges. 
Short-term orientation in turn might be responsible for leadership failure. When an 
alliance was intended to respond to disaster relief, inadequate emphasis was placed upon 
selecting partners and building governance structures, as shown in the case of SUO and 
CVRC, which contributed to partner misfit and inappropriate governance structures. 
However, such associations need further examination with more data. 
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The findings in this study contribute to nonprofit research due to its exploration in 
the field of nonprofit alliance, especially of alliance termination, a little examined topic. 
First, though environmental uncertainties are noted as a cause of collaboration failure, 
such literature is mainly about political coalitions (Lupia & Strom1995; Leeds & Savun 
2007; Wright & Golderberg 1985) and sometimes about international business 
partnerships (Serapio &Cascio 1996; Yan & Zeng1999). This study shows that 
environmental factors, mainly political pressure and resource shortage, played critical 
roles in alliance termination in the NGO sector. Even if it is understandable for alliance 
termination to be caused by resource shortage because of the widespread funding scarcity 
in nonprofit organization (Salamon & Anheier 1996), this finding yet raises another 
question: Are NGOs political? For Clarke (1998), the answer is definitely yes.  Although 
they are not political organizations existing for state power, NGOs do participate in 
politics more or less as long as they are engaged in empowering people for more equality, 
democracy, and social justice. In this sense, NGO alliances, especially those in 
developing countries, should be paid special concerns over their political influence since 
NGOs differ from nonprofit organizations usually defined in a broad sense.  
Second, this study enriches the knowledge of voluntary termination. Though most 
alliances have to terminate themselves as a negative response to external and internal 
challenges, some others with short-term orientations do voluntarily put an end to the 
partnerships. Being task-oriented is definitely an important reason as suggested by 
McLaughlin (2010), but short-term orientation also acts as a proactive strategy to adapt to 
the environment. It increases the flexibility of interorganizational collaboration and 
promotes the capacity for future partnerships. In this sense, disassociating termination 
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with collaborative failure, self-dissolution challenges the tradition of measuring alliance 
success by partnership stability and length (Das & Teng 1997; Yan & Zeng 1999).  
Finally, this research expands the understanding of internal tensions in 
interorganizational collaborations. Researchers in political science and business often 
find that internal rivalries among member organizations play the major role in alliance 
failure (Das & Teng 1999; Larsson 1998; Park & Ungson 2001). Some nonprofit 
researchers (for example, Dutte & Sugge 2010; Staggenborg 1986) similarly point out 
that partner conflicts lead to partnership dissolution. This study found the influence of 
internal tensions on one hand, but it also cast doubt on the assumed effect of strong 
partner rivalry on the other. NGO alliances created internal tensions mainly because of 
partner difference in terms of missions, focus areas, strategies, and even ideologies and 
personalities of leaders. But competition over resources or reputation rarely appeared as a 
significant element of collaborative relationships in the Sichuan Earthquake case.  
However, unlike Das and Teng’s argument about business alliances (Das & 
Teng1999), this study finds that mission misfit, in addition to resource misfit and 
strategic misfit, seriously threatened nonprofit alliances. This finding echoes many 
nonprofit studies on the important role of ideology and value in the nonprofit community 
(Berger 2004; Daley, Netting, & Angulo 1996). Furthermore, this investigation suggests 
that while resource fit and strategic fit determined alliance durability in the short term, it 
is mission fit that shaped the long-term partnership. But how these fit patterns interplayed 
is still unclear.  
This research also has practical implications for NGO professionals. First, the 
formation and development of 13 NGO alliances in China indicated that activists can 
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play an important role in creating space even in an adverse sociopolitical environment, 
especially when the environment becomes unclear with the shock of the critical event. 
Activists, embedded in their own social networks, have the opportunity to change the 
game and practically develop new game rules, just as Crozier and Friedberg (1980, 
pp.88-89) noted:  
Clearly, the relation to the environment cannot be reduced to a mere 
unilateral adaption to an exterior influence. It is actually a permanent 
process of exchange through which an organization opens itself selectively, 
so to speak, to the broader system of power in which it participates.  
 
Second, alliances are using a special strategy to bring NGOs together to address 
major social challenges. The timeframe of the partnership should be flexibly set by 
collective objectives. Therefore, whether an alliance is successful does not depend on its 
durability, but on its performance and impact.  
Third, building sustainable alliances requires excellent leadership despite 
overcoming environmental challenges. High partner fit, equal yet efficient governing 
structures, and strong individual leaders are all critical factors. No simple criteria can be 
used to measure partner fit because it depends on the alliance objectives and varies over 
time. However, compatibility in terms of core resources, major strategies, and core 
missions/values should be considered during partner selection. Governing structure 
should also be adaptable to membership size and to the nature of tasks and thus balance 
efficiency in decision making and equality among members.  
Finally, leaders who have good leading skills, large social networks, and high 
prestige will greatly increase the likelihood of alliance success and durability.  
There are some limitations to this study which require improvement in future 
research. The first limitation is about the Chinese context. On one hand, China’s neo-
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authoritarian regime sets rigid legislative restrictions against voluntary associations in 
order to ensure the unchallenged authority of the party state. Even social service NGOs 
would be regarded as a potential threat against its legitimacy and are oppressed when the 
public thinks highly of NGOs’ performance and accountability and compares them with 
the government. Meanwhile, the generally reform-oriented government has learned to 
cooperate with some “politically reliable” NGOs in social welfare programs in order to 
improve efficiency and meet the diversified social needs. The rigidity of law and the 
flexibility in practice create a lot of ambiguous space for NGOs’ operation, though they 
operate without reliable legal protection. Such a status deeply impacted NGO alliances’ 
specific environment characterized by political pressure, a trait that nonprofits may not 
share in democratic societies. On the other hand, the specific context also means a 
premature nonprofit sector which consists of few and young NGOs, scarce foundations, 
and minimally trained volunteers. Since few NGOs have a history of more than 10 years, 
the entire sector lacks the experience of interorganizational collaboration, which could 
make their collaborative behaviors different from their counterparts in societies where the 
nonprofit sector has been well developed. In order to examine the validity of the findings 
in this study, therefore, future studies should focus on samples in societies that accept 
NGOs with legislation and also have a relatively mature nonprofit sector.  
Second, alliances in this study were event-based rather than theme-based. This 
might lead to sample bias because event-based alliances are more likely to set up a 
definite timeline according to the expected life cycle of the specific event. However, 
alliances established for certain themes such as disease control, environment, labor rights, 
and social justice may have quite different timeframes because it is almost impossible to 
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develop a certain time period to complete such causes. In addition, the nature of crisis 
management might reinforce uncertainty in event-based alliances. As Comfort (1994) 
argues, rather than following documented plans or stable expectations, mobilization in 
crisis response often involves an unpredictable set of actors that vary greatly in terms of 
prior disaster experience, organizational sector, and other characteristics. Future studies 
may help overcome this sample bias by investigating both event-based and theme-based 
alliances, comparing their termination patterns, and analyzing the differences and 
similarities of termination mechanisms.  
Third, this study explores alliance termination only at the alliance level but does 
not examine the member organization level. The analysis at the alliance level has the 
merit of focusing on general characteristics and decision making mechanisms. But it also 
misses the influence of individual organizations upon the alliance. A mixed design in 
future studies can help combine the merits of both methods. In addition, future studies 
can also track the impact of alliance termination upon member organizations and answer 
the following questions: How did alliance termination influence participating 
organizations in terms of legitimacy, funding, networking, and performance? What did 
they learn from the alliance experience? Will they join cooperative partnerships again in 
the future?     
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APPENDIX:  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Please describe the profile of your alliance, including the formation and 
termination date, geographic focus, target beneficiaries, main projects, and major 
outcomes.  
2. Please describe the basic process of establishing the alliance. 
3. Why was your alliance established? 
4. Please give a brief description of the membership structure, including location, 
work area, registration, spending size, staff size, and their roles in the alliance.  
5. Please describe the organizational structure of the alliance. 
6. Did you offer any incentives to encourage member organizations’ engagement in 
the alliance? If yes, what were they? 
7. Did you take measures to reduce member organizations’ detachment? If yes, what 
were they? 
8. What were your major work areas? Why did you determine those work areas? 
9. What was the government’s attitude toward your alliance? Did your alliance 
collaborate with the government? 
10. Did any foundations give financial support for your alliance? 
11. How was your alliance terminated? And why? 
12. What did you learn from your collaboration experience?  
13. Are there any comments you wish to make or concerns you wish to share? 
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